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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1. Introduction and Objectives
Cotton is one unquestioned success of Zambia’s turn towards a market economy.  After
liberalization in late 1994, production rose from 20,000 mt to over 100,000 mt in the 1998
harvest year.  After collapsing to less than 50,000 mt in 2000, it has risen steadily and may
have approached 150,000 mt in 2003.  Over 1998-2000, exports of cotton and textiles were
first among all agricultural exports in value (Export Board of Zambia 2001).  The two closest
competitors to cotton during this time – fresh flowers and sugar – are  primarily produced on
large operations, while cotton is almost entirely a smallholder crop.  Its potential role in
poverty alleviation and food security is thus very large.  The success of this sector has been
achieved despite historically low cotton prices in the world market over the past four years,
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serious problems of credit default during the late 1990s, and the departure in 1999 of the
sector’s biggest company, Lonrho.
This paper grows out of earlier work on cotton by the Food Security Research Project
(Govereh et al. 2000; Tschirley and Zulu 2003).  It is directed towards policy makers and
private stakeholders in Zambia’s cotton sector, and has four main purposes:
• To provide a detailed descriptive overview of the organization of the sector and of the
behavior of key public and private participants in the sector, 
• To assess cotton’s role in smallholder livelihood strategies, and its competitiveness at
the farm level with a key alternative crop – maize.
• To critically evaluate recent policy initiatives in the sector and suggest key
modifications that might be needed, and 
• To identify the primary challenges that the sector faces to ensure its future
competitiveness in regional and international markets.  
The rest of this chapter provides historical background on the sector, prior to and since the
reforms in 1994.  Chapter 2 provides an overview of system organization, while Chapter 3
provides a relatively detailed description of the cotton supply chain.  Chapter 4 uses
household level survey data to examine cotton’s role in smallholder livelihood strategies and
to assess cotton’s profitability relative to maize, and relative to cotton in other countries. 
Chapter 5 critically examines three recent policy initiatives affecting or potentially affecting
the sector – the proposed Cotton Board, the Cotton Outgrower Credit Scheme, and changes in
the system of District levies.  We close in Chapter 6 by identifying key strategic issues that
public and private participants in the sector must deal with if the sector is to remain
competitive.  2
Fig 1:  Seed Cotton Production in Zambia Prior to Liberalization 




























From 1977 to 1994 the state-owned cotton company LINTCO (Lint Company of Zambia), on
behalf of government, purchased seed cotton from farmers at a fixed price, provided certified
seed, pesticides, sprayers, and bags and provided extension advice to farmers. LINTCO had a
near monopsony in buying seed cotton and a monopoly in distributing cotton inputs on credit.
The performance of the cotton sector during LINTCO’s tenure can be inferred from the only
available data from part of that period, from the annual crop forecast surveys conducted by
the government’s Central Statistical Unit (Figure 1). The data suggest that, from 1987 to the
year immediately following liberalization (1995), the overall production trend was
fluctuating but in decline overall.  According to Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA), the
body that was responsible for the eventual sale of LINTCO, the company was also in serious
financial crisis before its sale, having accumulated substantial unpaid debts. 
In 1994, as part of a concerted and broad-based effort by the new government of Frederick
Chiluba to restructure Zambia’s economy, LINTCO was sold to Lonrho Cotton and Clark. 
As such by 1996, there were several private ginners buying seed from farmers (Govereh et al
2000).
1.3. Developments Since Liberalization
Production data in Zambia are available from several sources, including the Central
Statistical Office’s (CSO) Crop Forecast Survey (CFS), CSO’s Post-Harvest Survey (PHS),3
and derived estimates from ginnery outturn.  These estimates do not all agree with each other,
but, with the exception of CFS data for 1999, paint a relatively consistent picture at least of
production trends since liberalization (Table 1).  After reaching what appears to be an all-
time low either the last year of LINTCO (1994, according to PHS data) or the first year of
liberalization (1995, according to CFS estimates), both PHS and derived ginnery estimates
indicate that production increased dramatically through the 1998 harvest year.  While CFS
shows a continued large increase in 1999, these data are inconsistent with PHS and derived
ginnery estimates, and also with the acknowledged crisis that the sector suffered that year. 
Thus, it seems clear that production in Zambia peaked in 1998 and fell substantially over the
next two years, to a low of less than 50,000 mt in 2000.  Since that time, however, production
has increased substantially every year, exceeding 1998’s record in 2002, and reaching as high
as 150,000 mt in the 2003 harvest.













# of households Production
Min Max
1993 32,944 32,343 23,103 47,851
1994 30,764 28,669 18,384 33,093
1995 32,824 28,450 27,991 16,578
1996 50,981 64,084 63,859 40,824 90,667 136,000 61,200
1997 85,514 74,279 58,051 70,000 110,972 166,458 79,900
1998 85,735 79,272 72,561 110,000 136,601 204,902 104,500
1999 70,159 63,000 50,858 140,024 104,568 156,852 84,700
2000 44,196 36,681 27,500 49,498 54,620 81,930 46,700
2001 87,422 87,026 65,979 57,083 80,000 120,000 72,000
2002 47,326 130,000 150,000 116,000
2003 130-150,000
(est.)
1 Planting in Zambia occurs in late November of early December each year, with harvest in May or June.  Thus,
the  harvest year 2001 refers to cotton planted in late 2000.  
2  Seed cotton production estimates derived from
lint production figures of Lonrho, Clark, and Amaka, and based on ginning outturn ration (GOR) of 0.38.  This
estimate does not include amounts ginned by other ginners, which may increase production totals by 5-10%
above those shown here.  Estimate of minimum (maximum) number of households assumes average of 1 ha (1.5
ha) cotton per farmer, with yields increasing from 450 kg/ha in 1996 to 600 kg/ha in 2001.
The strong expansion from 1994 to 1998 was made possible by much improved input
distribution to smallholders.  To expand the production base and benefit from the significant
scale economies that exist in cotton ginning, Lonrho and Clark initiated out-grower programs
to provide participating farmers with extension services and inputs on loan.  The cost of the
inputs were then deducted from the revenue paid to farmers when they sold their seed cotton
to the ginners or their designated assemblers.  Repayment rates were high (roughly 86% of
the value of loans disbursed by the industry, according to the Cotton Ginners Association
estimates) and cotton production increased dramatically, as seen in the PHS production
estimates.  During 1995 and 1996, competition in cotton buying and ginning was minimal as2  Amaka Holdings opened a ginnery in Kabwe District in 1997; Mulungushi Textiles also opened a ginnery in
Kabwe District in 1999 and Northern Growers acquired a ginnery built in Sinazeze District in 1986. 
Continental Textiles established a ginnery in Kalomo District in 1997.
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the two firms operated in different areas of the country.  This lack of competition among
firms meant that credit repayment was not a problem, and made it possible for firms to
aggressively promote the crops.  Very high international prices also facilitated this
expansion.  These international prices were high and rising at the time of liberalization,
peaked in 1995, and remained at remunerative (though much lower) levels into the 1998/99
growing season.
Since 1997 the expansion of the cotton production base attracted many new entrants onto the
scene, both in ginning and in assembly.  At least four new ginning companies emerged and
began to compete aggressively in the purchase of cotton
2  As a way of increasing the number
of farmers, some ginning firms contracted agents to recruit farmers on their behalf in addition
to the farmers directly recruited by them. These firms received inputs from the ginning
companies and distributed them to smallholders on the ginners’ behalf.  During harvest time
these firms purchased seed cotton from farmers and sold it to the ginners who had contracted
them.  There also emerged a group of independent cotton traders who obtained their own
inputs, distributed them to farmers, purchased seed cotton and sold to any ginner wishing to
purchase it.  
Government at the time was committed to a liberalized economic policy and made no attempt
to limit this competition, and firms started competing against each other in many districts. 
As the number of ginners and assemblers expanded, several key problems came to the fore. 
First, ginning capacity expanded to over 150,000 metric tonnes per annum, while production
rose to about 104,500 mt in 1998 and then declined over the next two years (according to
derived ginnery estimates).  This overcapacity created a competitive “scramble for cotton”
among ginners to increase their throughput and minimize unit ginning costs.  The emergence
of agents and independent traders contributed substantially to this scramble for cotton. 
Relatedly, firms operating outgrower schemes experienced increased loan default rates as
competing firms, some of which did not operate outgrower schemes and hence could afford
to offer higher prices, purchase cotton from farmers participating in other firms’ outgrower
programs.  These problems were exacerbated by the decline in world market prices since the
peak in 1995, which was passed on to farmers.  
Farmers had grown accustomed over several years to increasing prices, and with limited
information on world market conditions, they found it difficult to understand the reasons for
the declines in prices they were now receiving.  In US$ terms, producer prices fell from
$0.56/kg in 1995 to $0.18 in 1999.  They actually fell in nominal kwacha terms in 1997 and
again in 1998.  This, together with a lack of transparency in how each buyer determines its
prices and how they deduct input costs, lead many farmers and their representatives to
conclude that they were being exploited.  This environment of lack of information and
mistrust had in all likelihood contributed to the increasing rate at which farmers were 
defaulting on their loans and side selling to other firms. The loan repayment rate dropped
from almost 86% in 1996 to about 65% in 1999 and 2000 (Ginner interviews 2002).3  One outgrower company states that in 1999 it attempted to offset its loan defaults by adding a 50% mark up
to the price of inputs.
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At the same time, increased default rates created incentives for outgrower firms to capitalize
their bad loans into the cost of inputs for those farmers who did repay.
3  This compelled the
outgrower firms to offer a lower net price for cotton after deducting the cost of inputs on
credit, forcing some of the costs of loan default onto those farmers who remained loyal and 
repaid their loans.  But imposing the costs of loan defaults on loyal farmers fuels a potential
vicious cycle of further loan defaults or exit from participation in outgrower programs.  
A crisis point was reached in 1999.  Lonrho, the largest outgrower buyer, put itself up for sale
as an ongoing concern and was sold to Dunavant, a privately held U.S. cotton company. 
Lonrho’s decision to sell its cotton operations in Zambia was believed to be based primarily
on complex corporate headquarters investment strategies throughout Africa, but Lonrho also
cited  $2 million per year in Zambia in unpaid loans as a major barrier to be overcome by
new investors.  Other ginning/outgrower  firms also cut back on the number of farmers they
were supporting with production loans from the 1999/2000 season.  Since over 90% of the
seed cotton ginned up to 1997 was produced by farmers participating in outgrower schemes,
the problem of outgrower loan default clearly threatened the entire sector (Govereh et al
2000).  Production in 2000 fell to less than half the level of 1998.
Since this nadir, the sector has undergone major structural change, and has recovered
dramatically.  The agents and independent buyers that contributed so much to the credit
repayment problems in the late 1990s largely disappeared.  At least one of the new ginners,
Amaka, went out of business in late 2002.  The decline of the cotton trading sector and the
closing of Amaka were associated with two parallel strategies adopted by Dunavant.  First, it
launched in 1999, and over the next several years it refined, its “Distributor System”, which
dramatically improved credit repayment rates among farmers. Second, Dunavant used this
system to aggressively expand its production network.  Partly as a result, national production
tripled between 2000 and 2003, and credit repayment improved from about 65% to over 90%. 
Finally, government’s hands-off approach to the sector began to change.  Potentially positive
initiatives include support to private outgrower credit schemes, and a public/private proposal
for a Cotton Board to deal with regulatory issues.  More worrisome is the emergence in 2003
of levies charged by some districts on cotton leaving its borders.
Succeeding chapters will deal with each of these issues.  Chapter 2 will provide an overview
of the organization of the sector, including its actors, key coordination mechanisms, and key
problems.  Chapter 3 describes the supply chain from seed and other inputs through
marketing of lint and sub-products.  Chapter 4 uses nationally representative household level
data to examine the role of cotton in smallholder livelihoods. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on
emerging policy issues, providing a description and initial assessment of new initiatives
coming out of the public sector.  6
2.  OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM ORGANIZATION
2.1. Actors 
2.1.1. Small-holders
According to the ginning companies interviewed nearly all seed cotton is grown by small
scale farmers with less than three hectares of area devoted to cotton.  Data on the number of
households involved in cotton are not consistent with each other (Table 1), with estimates
from the PHS being consistently lower than derived ginnery estimates, and also lower than
the number of households that ginners claim to be working with.  Based on probable acreage
and yields, it seems very likely that the number of households growing cotton exceeded
100,000 during 2-3 years around the 1998 peak, falling by as much as 2/3 in 2000, but
recovering steadily since that time and certainly exceeding the 1998 peak in 2003.
All the firms running cotton out-grower schemes expressed a desire to deal with larger
farmers but stated that there were very few large scale farmers involved in cotton growing.
One firm stated that it would soon start running a large cotton farm so that it can insure
constant supplies of cotton. This initiative will need to be carefully watched, as experience in
the region suggests that difficulties in labor supervision combined with high costs of
mechanical technology and fuel, often makes large-scale cotton production unprofitable.
2.1.2. Ginners
Dunavant has the largest ginning capacity totaling 93,000 metric tonnes  per season (Table
2). Clark has the second largest ginning capacity at 55,000 tonnes per season. Together,
Dunavant and Clark account for 74% of the total ginning capacity in Zambia with Dunavant
accounting for 46% and Clark accounting for 28%.  Dunavant constructed a new gin in
Petauke district  (Eastern Province) in 2003 with the capacity of 17,000 metric tonnes which
was scheduled to start operating in October, 2003. Dunavant was also, as of September 2003,
conducting feasibility studies for a similar capacity plant in Lundazi district (Eastern
Province).  The other gins are owned by Mulungushi, with a capacity of 10,000 mt per
season, Continental with 8,000 mt, and Mukuba Textiles with 1,000 metric tones per season. 
Amaka’s gin, with a capacity of 22,000 mt is now defunct and has been put up for sale. As of
September 2003, the plant had not yet been bought.
The data on ginning capacity understate the level of concentration in the ginning industry. 
Data on throughput for the 1997/98 season indicate that Dunavant (Lonrho at the time) and
Clark dominate the industry with 90% of throughput between them (vs less than 75% of
ginning capacity). The drop-off in ginning by Amaka and Mulungushi from the 2000/01
cropping year, and the closure of Amaka in 2002, suggest that the market shares of Dunavant
and Clark have increased from 1997/98.  Though data from Clark are not forthcoming,
interviews with various participants and observers suggest that its share relative to Dunavant
may have fallen since that time.7
Table 2. Location of Gins in Zambia
Company Gin Location Capacity
(MT/season)
Seed Cotton throughput
97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02
Dunavant Katete, Eastern Province 22,000 14,000 11,832 7,309 13,892 20,992
Lusaka, Lusaka Province 10,000 7,000 3,866 0 0 3,579
Mumbwa, Central Province 25,000 12,000 12,119 8,370 15,214 24,956
Gwembe, Southern Province 19,000 11,000 8,888 4,828 10,538 17,620
Petauke, Eastern Province 17,000 N/O N/O N/O N/O N/O
     Sub-total  93,000 44,000 36,705 20,507 39,644 67,147
Clark Two gins in Chipata, Eastern Prov. 55,000 35,000 x x x x
Continental Kalomo, Southern Province 8,000 3,500 x x 6,200 x
Mulungushi Kabwe, Central Province 10,000 3,000 x x 1,684 x
Amaka Kabwe, Central Province 22,000 2,500 x x 400 x
Mukuba Ndola, Copperbelt Province 1,000 x x x x x
Total 189,000
x=data not available.  N/O=not operational (Dunavant’s Petauke gin was installed in 2003)
Source: Zambian Cotton Sector Review, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 2000; FSRP Ginners
Survey 2003
Mulungushi Textiles is a joint venture between the Government of Zambia and the
Government of China. This unusual arrangement in an otherwise entirely privatized industry
has caused unease among competing private companies, some of whom suggest that the
arrangement might confer competitive advantages to Mulungushi, especially in the area of
working and investment capital, that these other firms do not have.  There is, however,
currently no concrete evidence of these and other possible advantages conferred on
Mulungushi 
2.1.3. Input Dealers
Input dealers in Zambia play very little direct role in providing cotton inputs to farmers. 
Available evidence indicates that nearly all cotton inputs in Zambia are delivered to farmers
through the cotton companies or through cotton company agents (these latter are mostly
Dunavant Distributors) who receive the inputs from the cotton companies. The cotton
companies negotiate for inputs in bulk from local and international companies.  With regard
to seed, all companies interviewed reported that they grow their own seed through contract
farmers and the seed is certified by the Seed Control and Certification Institute (SCCI), the
government’s certification unit under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO).8
2.1.4. Textile Mills
Over 85% of the local demand for lint comes from textile mills in Copperbelt Province and in
Kabwe in Central Provinces. Ninety percent of the production of these mills is exported as
yarn with only a very small proportion retained for weaving into cloth and blankets. Table 3
shows the location of mills and the total demand for lint.
During the 2001/02 season, Dunavant indicates that it sold nearly 20% of its lint in the local
market, exporting the rest.  The cotton ginners and Swarp (a spinner) estimate that 90% of
Swarp’s lint needs are met by purchases from Dunavant and Clark; the balance appears to
come from smaller ginners.  Mukuba Textiles and Mulungushi Textiles both have gins within
their premises and purchase seed cotton for processing.  Starflex, Excel, Mulungushi and
Kafue have all experienced serious financial problems in the recent past which have led to
temporary and sometimes prolonged shut downs.  The other smaller spinners indicate that
they periodically import to meet their lint needs when they are unable to reach agreement on
price with local ginners.
2.1.5. Government and NGOs
From 1994 (when the government privatized LINTCO) through the 2000/01 season, there
was very little government involvement in the sector, whether as a direct participant or a
significant regulator of private activities.  Government still has no role in pricing,
competition policy, or marketing regulation.  The main role has been agronomic research
through the Cotton Development Trust (CDT). The Trust came into being in November, 1999
with the following stated objectives:
(i) To conduct, encourage, assist or support agricultural development in Zambia
or elsewhere into aspects of agriculture not limited to cotton.
(ii) To promote and develop cotton including research, extension, farmer training
and seed production.
(iii) To undertake cotton programs which Government or other sector bodies may be
unable to initiate, continue or complete and to complete and complement and
supplement the agricultural research, extension and seed production activities of
Government of the Republic of Zambia or other bodies.9
Table 3. Spinning Mills and Annual Lint Demand in Zambia, 2002
Textile Mill Location Throughput
(MT)
1
Swarp Ndola, Copperbelt Province 14,000
Mukuba Ndola, Copperbelt Province 1,900
Starflex Ndola, Copperbelt Province 1,200
Excel Ndola, Copperbelt Province 1,650
Mulungushi Kabwe, Central Province 3,000
Kafue Kafue 3,000
Others Mostly Copperbelt Province 1,000
Total 25,750
1 Sources: Data on Swarp from phone interview with that company.  Other data based on estimates by Swarp
and Zambian Cotton Sector Review (ZCSR), Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 2000
Through 2000/01, the Trust focused exclusively on technical aspects of cotton production,
including varietal development.  The Trust is managed by a board that consists of
government and cotton industry representatives.  It was designed to be independent of
government, but is criticized by some in the private sector for not being sufficiently
independent nor sufficiently responsive to needs in the sector.  As a result, CDT is currently
funded by government and donors, though the intention is for the ginning companies also to
contribute to its support through a ginning levy at some point.  The main achievements since
its inception have been in the area of agronomic research where the Trust has cooperated
with private firms, primarily Dunavant, on the development of new varieties, though none of
these have yet been released.  Other achievements have been:
1. Seed multiplication in terms of production of breeder and pre-basic seed.
2. The production of a comprehensive cotton hand book for use by farmers and
promoters, and smaller guides in Chi Chewa and Tonga for use by smallholder
farmers (these guides are being done in collaboration with the French Embassy).
3.  The production of a cotton suitability study including maps of suitability classes.
Moving beyond technical research, the CDT worked with private sector to prepare the draft
Cotton Act and cabinet memo proposing the formation of the Cotton Board.  This legislation
has been delayed within MACO for some months, due in part to a complaint to MACO by
the heretofore little known Cotton Growers’ Association.  As of September 2003, MACO
plans to hold “stakeholder consultations” on the bill before presenting it to the Minister for
onward transmission to cabinet and parliament.  Chapter 5 will describe the Act and assess
the potential contribution of the Cotton Board in more detail.
In recent years, some NGOs and donors have become interested in building on and further
developing the Dunavant Distributor System (see below for further details on this system) in4  ZNFU is engaged primarily in policy and program dialogue with government and donors.  Little is known at
this point about the Cotton Growers’ Association, though it appears to be composed primarily or large
commercial growers.
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order to further the cause of farmer organization.  The Smallholder Enterprise and Marketing
Program (SHEMP), funded by IFAD, has a stated goal of building the loosely defined farmer
groups within the Distributor System into autonomous farmer associations independent of
Dunavant and able to engage in multiple activities.  The project began in 2002.  Most
recently, CLUSA (Cooperative League of the USA) had expressed interest in collaborating
with Dunavant and the Cotton Ginners’ Association in its “Food Security and Poverty
Alleviation through Cotton” proposal.  The proposal called for a rotating fund for cotton
inputs which would, additionally, fund a minimal level of inputs for maize production among
farmers growing cotton. 
Funding was expected by Dunavant and CLUSA from the Government but this has not been
forthcoming.  Government has opted to put their funding in their own commercialization
program which bears some resemblance to the “Food Security and Poverty Alleviation
through Cotton” proposal. However, CLUSA have adopted the Distributor system for other
crops including maize, albeit for a small pilot group in Central province, and the repayment
rates have been between 95 and 100%. 
2.2. Key Coordination Mechanisms
Extra-market coordination within Zambia’s cotton sector has focused most intensively on
vertical coordination between ginners and smallholder farmers, and to a lesser extent between
ginners and spinners. Efforts at horizontal coordination among, for example, ginning
companies, have been intermittent, as have been sector-wide initiatives involving multiple
players from all levels in the system.  The Cotton Act and proposed Cotton Board represent
the first attempts to encourage such sector-wide coordination.  Appendix Table 1 provides a
summary of coordination mechanisms observed in the sector.
2.2.1. Ginners and Smallholders
Coordination among ginners and smallholders focuses primarily on efforts by ginning
companies to resolve the input delivery and credit recovery problems that began to emerge in
1997.  With few exceptions, smallholders as a group have not been able to participate
actively in broader coordination efforts.  A key reason for this is that there are currently few,
if any, independent and self-supporting smallholder farmer organizations in Zambia capable
of engaging in commercial negotiations with companies and delivery marketing or other
services to their members.
4
2.2.2. For Input Distribution and Credit Recovery
The recovery of credit delivered in-kind as production inputs has been the principle focus of
overt conflict within the cotton sector.  After privatization in 1994, this conflict began to5  The company refers to farmers under a Distributor as farmer groups.  In fact, the farmers are groups in only
the loosest sense, being organized explicitly for cotton production and without a structure to allow them to be
active as a group in other commercial activities.
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emerge as early as 1997 and reached a peak in the 1998/99 cropping season.  The absence of
any direct government role in regulating competition within the sector or in mediating the
intense conflicts which emerged meant that ginning companies had to develop their own
approaches to solving this problem.
A period of significant private institutional innovation began in 1999 at the initiative of
Lonrho, which at the time was already in the process of being sold to Dunavant.  Starting
with the 1999/2000 growing season, the company began to create what it called its
Distributor System to replace its original system for delivering inputs on credit to farmers and
recovering the credit.  The original system relied on a large number of direct company
employees, including approximately 800 extension agents, to carry out the required activities. 
The Distributor System involved eliminating nearly all directly employed extension agents
and selectively offering them a formal written contract as an independent “Distributor”. 
These Distributors were responsible for identifying farmers to whom they wished to provide
cotton inputs
5, receiving the inputs on credit from Dunavant, delivering these inputs to their
selected farmers along with technical advice, and ensuring the sale of the farmers’ crop to
Dunavant in order to recover the input credit.  The Distributor’s remuneration is directly tied
to the amount of credit recovered, on an increasing scale.  For the first three years of the
Distributor program up to 60% recovery, a Distributor would receive 5% of the value of the
recovery; upon reaching 80% recovery, the Distributor would receive an additional 7.5% of
the total recovered amount; and upon reaching 100% recovery, the Distributor would receive
an additional 12% of the total recovery. In the 2003 season the bands were revised to 65%,
85% and 100%. Thus, Distributors may earn as much as 21.6%
(.65 * .05 + .85 * .075 + 1 * .12 = 0.21) of the total amount of credit they disburse. In the
2003 season the contracts also required more documentation to verify purchases.
Dunavant screens all Distributors, and requires that each produce cotton themselves and live
in the same area as the farmers to whom they provide services.  Company policy has been to
drop any Distributor who does not reach at least 50% repayment.  In the most recent season,
that figure was raised to 60%; in Mumbwa district of Central province, where the company
has been most active and had the best success, the cut-off is now 80%.  During the 2001/02
growing season, Dunavant had nearly 1,400 Distributors, each working with an average of
about 62 farmers.  The organizational structure of the Distributor system includes a
“Coordinator” for every five- to seven Distributors.  The Coordinator is the company’s main
link to Distributors, and is responsible for organizing cotton purchases for the company. 
“Area Credit Managers” are employed directly by Dunavant and oversee about seven
Distributor Coordinators in addition to managing depots where the company keeps inputs for
delivery on credit and seed and basal fertilizer for cash sale.  
The company seems to invest heavily in training of Distributors, providing them with two
types of training; credit management and cotton production and harvesting. The credit
management course is conducted once a year by Dunavant Headquarters managers in
conjunction with their area managers.  It aims primarily at improving the Distributor’s ability
to pick good farmers and keep them.  The other main focus of the course is to strengthen6  The training was carried out in three different locales over the course of about four weeks.  One of the authors
traveled to each session to explain the questionnaire and collect it after Distributors had completed it. 
7  See Zulu and Tschirley 2003, forthcoming, for analytical results.  This interpretation is consistent with
Dunavant’s understanding.  When presented with the results, Dunavant managers suggested that they had also
observed this tendency and associated it with the best Distributors.
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credit recovery strategies. These skills are not extension skills but are aimed solely at the
distributor. 
The production training is conducted in three phases.  The first phase occurs before planting,
with a focus on production techniques such as timing of planting to maximize yields.  The
second phase is held just after planting, and is aimed at the best use of chemicals and other
products to control weeds and pests. The third phase of the training is on harvesting and
storage, with a strong emphasis on how to keep the cotton free from contamination and how
to grade properly to maximize homogeneity within grades.  The production training is
extension training and this is aimed at equipping the distributors with knowledge to be passed
on to their farmers.
To maximize their earnings, Distributors need to balance the number of farmers against their
knowledge of the farmers and perceived probability that they will be able to repay.  They
must also judge how much time they should put into extension efforts, and with which
farmers, since there will be some trade-off between the number of farmers the Distributor is
able to support and the level of support he/she provides to each of them.  Several Distributors
interviewed informally indicated that they were supporting too many farmers during the past
growing season, were having difficulty overseeing them and ensuring credit recovery, and
would reduce the number of farmers they supported the following year.  
Yet empirical data on Distributor behavior (Table 4) suggest that the typical Distributor
steadily increases the number of farmers they work with.  In January and February 2003,
Dunavant collaborated with the Food Security Research Project to conduct a small interview
with about 1,400 Distributors during the second production training.
6  The one-page
questionnaire covered the Distributors’ age and sex, several questions on years of experience
and links to the area in which they work, data on number of farmers the Distributor worked
with during each of the past four years (including the current year – 2002/03) and repayment
rates for the past three years.  In the cropping year 2001/2002 the average number of farmers
for distributors who had been operating for one year was 47 compared to 77 for distributors
who have been working for four years.   Distributors who had worked for three years by that
time had increased their number of farmers to 71 from 52 in 99/00 and 64 in 00/01.  
Regression results from this survey also showed that, while controlling for key factors such
as the Distributors’ age, gender, education, years working in the same area, and others, the
number of farmers that a Distributor worked with was positively associated with repayment
rates.  This result suggests that the number of farmers is actually an indicator of unobserved
managerial abilities of the Distributor that allow him or her to successfully work with more
farmers.
7  
Thus, it appears that Distributors have a good deal of flexibility regarding how many and
which farmers to support; this observation is consistent with Dunavant’s view of Distributors
as small businessmen rather than company employees.  13
From the company’s perspective, the Distributor system greatly diminishes the amount of
information that the company needs to manage to ensure adequate credit recovery.  The
company develops strong relationships with a limited number of Distributors and creates
incentives for them to recover as much credit for the company as possible.  Thus, the
company attempts to substitute the Distributors’ local knowledge, social capital, and financial
incentives (specified in the written contract) for its own data bases and enforcement
mechanisms.  
Table 4. Average Number of Farmer Per Distributor, by Years as a Distributor in the
Same Area
Years as Distributor in
same area
Growing Season Number of Growers per
Distributor N 
Mean Median
1  2001/02 47 42 341 
2  2001/02 65 54 236 
   2000/01 51 44 238 
3  2001/02 77 65 353 
   2000/01 64 54 352 
   1999/2000 52 44 346 
Total  2001/02 63 51 930 
   2000/01 59 50 590 
   1999/2000 52 44 346 
Source: Dunavant Distributor Survey 2003.
With the exception of Clark Cotton, which continues to employ its own staff to contract
farmers, deliver inputs and recover credit, other cotton ginning companies in the country
follow an approach similar to, though less developed than, the Distributor System.  
Dunavant reports that credit recovery through this system rose from 67% in 1998/99 (year
prior to the system) to 80% in 1999/00, 88% in 2000/01, and 93% in 2001/02.  While these
trends show clear improvement, it should be noted that 88% and even 93% repayment is still
not considered “high” in most finance schemes, and remains well below the rates of 98%
claimed by, for example, Cottco in Zimbabwe. 
The Distributor system appears to be an important private institutional innovation designed
and executed in an environment in which government played no direct role, and only a minor
indirect role, in the cotton input credit system.  Key questions regarding the system include:
• To what extent can it be credited with the improvement in loan recovery rates during its
first three years of operation?  Loan recovery had already improved substantially the
year before the system was launched, to 67% from 53%.  Understanding the reasons for
this improvement and the role that the Distributor system played in continuing the
upward trend is crucial.14
• Is the system financially sustainable for the company?  Dunavant indicates that the
system remains expensive and suggests that aid money is needed to strengthen groups
and, presumably, reduce company costs.  The fact that Dunavant promoted the Food
Security through Cotton proposal and actively participated in the government-funded
Cotton Outgrower Credit Scheme also suggests that the company may not see the
Distributor System as a final solution to its input credit challenge.
• What is the Distributors’ level of knowledge of cotton production?  Dunavant maintains
ongoing training activities for Distributors in which it promotes simple, apparently
well-designed extension messages.  Yet the expense of the system, especially when
competitors may not be incurring the same level of expense, suggests that it may be
difficult for the company to invest as much as it may like to in this effort.
• How much extension assistance do farmers receive from the Distributors?  Even if
Distributors are well trained and knowledgeable, they must judge the value to them of
investing their time in extension compared to the option of supporting a larger number
of farmers.  The details of their contract with Dunavant could clearly affect this
calculation.  Have any Distributors hired anyone to assist them with extension or other
duties?  How much variability is there among Distributors in the level of knowledge
they pass on?
• What are farmer and Distributor perceptions of the system, especially compared to the
old system where company employees provided input credit and extension, and
recovered credit?
2.2.3. For Price Setting
There has been no government mandated price, nor any pricing guidance of any kind from
government, since liberalization in 1994.  There is also no evidence that these authors are
aware of that ginning companies have engaged farmers in dialogue or negotiation regarding
the price that they will pay, although ZNFU (Zambia National Farmers’ Union) has been
involved in at least two sector-wide stakeholders’ meetings since 1999.  Dunavant has
typically acted as a price leader, announcing a minimum pre-planting price to farmers, which
may be adjusted upwards at the start of the buying season.  Smaller ginners have typically
paid higher prices than Dunavant, but their constrained working capital and smaller buying
infrastructure limit the amount of cotton they can purchase. 
As competition among private firms began to emerge in 1997, price competition became a
key tool in attracting buyers, and also contributed to the serious credit repayment problems
which began at that time.  A lack of transparency in price setting was stated by some as
contributing to misunderstandings between farmers and outgrowers firms, and thus to the
repayment crisis (Govereh et al. 2000).  There appears still to be some significant variability
in the level of support offered to smallholders by the various ginners, which can create
conditions for using price to attract sellers who may have received input support from another
company.  15
With the passing of the credit repayment crisis and the reduction in intensity of competition
in many areas of the country, there exists the potential for companies with near monopsony
positions to suffer reduced efficiency over time and pass such inefficiencies on to farmers in
the form of lower prices.  Whether or not this happens depends on the organizational culture
of the firms involved, on the potential for new buyers to enter if prices fall too far, on the
level of education and strength of organization of farmers, and on the role of sectoral
organizations in monitoring sector performance.  
Table 5 shows the prices offered by some ginning companies at buying stations to farmers
during the 2002 harvest season.
Table 5. Prices Offered to Producers for Various Grades of Seed Cotton by Selected




Mulungushi Dunavant Amaka Continental
-------  ZK Per kg for 2002 harvest season  -------
Grade A 920 860 960 870
Grade B 900 840 950 850
Grade C 880 810 940 825
Dunavant is the only company that announces a price before planting in late October.  For the
2003 harvest season, the company announced a minimum price ZK 1,000 per kilogram in
October 2002, though it ended up buying at ZK 1,220 later in the season. 
2.2.4. For Conflict Resolution
There is no body in Zambia currently which serves as a forum for ginners and farmers to
address and resolve conflicts among them. CDT, whose mandate is broad enough for it to
play this role, is currently focusing mostly on technical issues.  The Agricultural Consultative
Forum in conjunction with the MACO has held a few meetings bringing farmers and ginners
together, but there has been no sustained effort in this regard. 
2.2.5. Between Ginners and Textile Mills
Other than Mulungushi Textiles and Mukuba Textiles which operate as both ginners and
spinners,, all other spinners on the Copperbelt purchase their lint from Dunavant,
Continental, and in the recent past Amaka.  Mukuba Textiles does not have a bale press in the
gin plant and as such cannot store the cotton lint that it produces.  As a result, and due to the
small size of their gin, they purchase cotton lint for a large part of the year.
Pricing on domestic lint sales has been a source of controversy between ginners and spinners. 
Spinners suggest that they buy the lint from the ginners at a fob price plus a premium16
determined by the ginners. For their part, ginners indicate that they negotiate a price with
spinners between import and export parity, as would be expected in a market setting.  This
issue needs to be better understood, as pricing appears to be a source of much discontent
among the spinners.  
2.2.6. Horizontal Coordination among Ginners
The Ginners’ Association of Zambia was set up in 1999 as a forum for ginners to discuss
common problems and lobby government for selected solutions.  Currently, the association
does not have an office and a permanent secretariat but the members occasionally meet,
usually at the Dunavant headquarters office. The Association has regularly lobbied
government on policy issues, focusing primarily on credit recovery.  In June 2002, it
presented to the new government its proposal for “Food Security through Cotton”, and then
participated actively in the Cotton Outgrower Credit Scheme when elements of the earlier
proposal were folded into that. 
2.3. Key Problems in the Sector
2.3.1. Farm-level Productivity
Farm yields in Zambia appear to be relatively good compared to most Southern and Eastern
Africa producers.  Dunavant claims average yields in 2002 of more than 600 kg/ha, and 900
kg/ha in Eastern Province.  Clark likewise claims yields above 900 kg/ha in Eastern.  Yields
approaching one tonne per hectare with no fertilizer reflect broad use of treated seed, timely
availability of pesticides, and good farm level management.  Dunavant’s attention to training
of Distributors would seem to have made an important contribution in this regard.  Yet yields
continue to lag well behind those in Zimbabwe and West & Central Africa, and lint quality is
substantially lower than in Zimbabwe.  These patterns reflect at least in part the fact that only
one new variety has been released since liberalization (Ngwezi in 1995), and it has not been
taken up.  Currently used varieties were released over 10 years ago.  See Section VI.C for a
discussion of policy approaches to deal with this issue.
2.3.2. Costs of Production
Another problem in the cotton sector that affects almost all economic activity in Zambia are
the  very high costs of operation.  These high costs are related to, among other factors, the
country’s low population density, its land-locked status and long distance from ports, and a
limited and poorly maintained system of secondary and tertiary roads.  See section IV for
details on farm-level costs of production of cotton.
2.3.3. Ginning Overcapacity
Until 2003, the highest production in the country since sector reform was 1997/1998 with a
total ginning throughput of 105,000 metric tonnes, according to derived ginnery estimates.17
With ginning capacity of 169,000 metric tonnes, the sector as a whole was paying relatively
high unit processing costs.  However, production in 2002 was 116,000 mt, and may have
reached 150,000 mt in 2003.  At the same time, Amaka’s ginnery with 22,000 mt capacity
went out of business, and Dunavant added 17,000 mt of additional capacity.  Working
capacity in the country is therefore about 167,000, hardly excessive in light of this year’s
production.  More generally, the production variability in Zambia due to rainfed production
systems means that the sector needs to maintain excess capacity in most years to be able to
handle years of high production.  In this light, ginning capacity in Zambia is not excessive,
and may in fact need to be expanded if production levels continue to rise.
2.3.4. World Prices
International cotton lint prices rose in the 2002/03 marketing year (August 02-July 03) to
nearly US$0.56/lb, from the historic low of US$0.42/lb the previous year.  September 2003
projections by ICAC (International Cotton Advisory Council) are for prices to continue their
recovery and to average US$0.60/lb for the 2003/04 marketing year, then to fall slightly to
US$0.59/lb for 2004/05.  Past patterns in world markets show long declines followed by only
partial recovery over 2-3 years, resulting in a steady secular decline in prices.  If this pattern
repeats itself, world prices may not continue to increase after the current marketing season. 
This implies that Zambia needs to proceed on two tracks if it is to compete on the world
stage.  First and foremost, it must invest in productivity enhancing technology and cost
reducing public investments.  While developed country subsidies to cotton producers,
especially in the U.S. (Becker, Geoffrey and Womack 2002), have substantially contributed
to the recent very low prices and profitability crisis for ginners and farmers in Zambia and
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the long-term trend for cotton, as for nearly every other
agricultural commodity, is primarily driven by productivity increases throughout the world. 
The progress that the two main firms have made improving smallholder management
practices and raising yields must continue, and must be complemented by improved cotton
varieties, by a serious examination of the potential for Bt cotton in the country, and by
infrastructural investments that reduce the cost of doing business in the country.
Second, it would be in Zambia’s interest to join the recent move by Brazil, India, China,
South Africa and other developing countries depending on agricultural exports to form a
negotiating block in the WTO.  Balanced application of free trade rules in the WTO would
certainly lead to the elimination of developed world subsidies on cotton – and on other
commodities – and allow Zambia and other producing countries to compete on a level
playing field.
2.3.5. Loan Default
After subsiding substantially during the 2000 and 2001 harvests, there were fears that loan
default by farmers would reemerge as a significant problem during the drought-affected 2002
harvest.  In fact, Dunavant indicates that, while recoveries may have fallen, the decrease was
modest.  Nevertheless, the legal system to address loan default is weak and expensive relative
to the average costs of these loans, meaning that affected companies will have little redress if
the problem does reemerge with more force in future years.8  See Chapter 5 for more detail, including an assessment of the potential problems with these initiatives. 
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2.3.6. Lint Pricing
The pricing of lint by the local gins to the local spinners has been seen as a major draw back
to spinning in Zambia.  Prior to Lintco privatization, lint was available at Liverpool Index
price less the freight element. Currently, spinners indicate that the ginners put a premium on
the Liverpool Index price which is treated as the Liverpool fob price (Patel & Mtonga 2002). 
2.3.7. Import of Subsidized Textiles, Garments, and Used Clothing
The influx, particularly from Asia, South Africa, and COMESA countries, of subsidized
textiles and garments nearly precludes the development of a garment industry in Zambia at
the current time.  The salaula (imported second hand clothes) factor, whatever its social and
political benefits, has had an adverse effect on the local clothing industry.
2.3.8. Government Sectoral Policies
Zambia has a long history of concentrating agricultural incentives heavily on maize.  Prior to
the beginning of liberalization a decade ago, heavy fertilizer and transport subsidies for maize
threatened to bankrupt the country.  Policy reforms since that time have reduced much of that
support, but governments have found it difficult to broaden their policy focus beyond this
crop.  Until recently, the Food Reserve Agency delivered fertilizer on credit to farmers for
use on maize; because of very low repayment rates, the scheme amounted to free fertilizer for
many maize producers.  During 2003 it was proposed to abolish the FRA and replace it with
a Crop Marketing Authority (CMA), which would continue to focus on maize but would not
have any role in fertilizer distribution.  While the proposed move away from subsidized
fertilizer distribution through FRA was positive, the proposed focus of CMA on maize would
have continued the country’s long fixation on that crop.  The situation in late 2003 is unclear,
as CMA has been taken off the table due to concerns about its feasibility, and the possibility
remains that FRA will begin once again to distribute fertilizer.  
Government also continues periodically to suggest that it will pay attractive support prices
for maize, announcing in 2001 at planting time that it intended to offer US$140/metric tonne.
Some ginners feel that this focus on maize distorts farmer decision making and results in
swings into maize (and out of cotton), then back out of the crop when government fails to
fully deliver on its commitments.  Other observers and some farmers suggest that these policy
statements have little effect on farmer behavior due to skepticism about government’s ability
to deliver.  Recent policy initiatives by government, including the Cotton Outgrower Fund
and the proposed Cotton Board, suggest the beginning of a broader focus within government
more driven by comparative advantage or at least by perceived commercial opportunities
within the agricultural sector.
8  9  Clark Cotton is South African owned, with local headquarters in Chipata, Eastern Province, and no office in
Lusaka.  They have historically not been involved in the discussions and initiatives emanating from Lusaka, and
have offered only limited collaboration in this study. 
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3. DESCRIPTION OF THE COTTON SUPPLY CHAIN
3.1. Seeds
3.1.1. Varietal Development & Agricultural Research
Prior to the formation of CDT, all cotton research was done by the MACO Research Branch.
The ministry’s researchers conducted trials with government funding and were responsible
for releasing varieties. All these responsibilities were transferred to CDT after its inception.
The ministry’s researchers were also transferred to CDT. Three varieties developed by
MACO which have been released are Chureza (1988), F135 (1992/93) and Ngwezi (1995).
The ginners have chosen to multiply Chureza and F135, meaning that it has been almost 10
years since a new variety entered the production system in Zambia. Chureza is best adapted
to dry areas and predominates in Southern and Eastern provinces, while F135 is mostly used
in Central and Western provinces.  CDT reports that the ginners are satisfied with the fibre
characteristics of these two varieties and that is why they are not multiplying Ngwezi, the
most recent release.  Other varieties that CDT indicates are in the pipeline are CDT1, CDT2
and CDT3. 
3.1.2. Seed Multiplication and/or Importation
Interviews with ginners and MACO representatives indicate that there is no cotton seed that
is imported into the country.  All ginning companies collect seed from their ginning process
and then use this seed as input for their contract farmers. The seed that is grown by the
contract farmers is then certified by officials from the Seed Control and Certification
Institute. Other than Dunavant and most likely Clark,
9 all other ginners distribute their seed
untreated.  Dunavant makes a range of seed available to farmers, including “fuzzy” untreated
seed, mechanically delinted treated seed, and acid-delinted treated seed.  The company offers
seed as part of the credit package, but at different prices, and farmers are able to choose
which they want to use.  Acid-delinted is used almost exclusively by commercial farmers
with mechanical planters.  Mechanically delinted seed is first mechanically delinted and then
treated with systemic fungicides.  The primary purpose of delinting is to minimize the
amount of chemical needed for the treatment.  Delinting also  makes it easier to avoid
overseeding, since the fuzzy seed tends to stick together.  A potential advantage of fuzzy seed
is that the thick hair on the seed retains moisture around it, and may make the seed less
susceptible to dry conditions.  In 2001/02, two-thirds of Dunavant smallholder farmers used
mechanically delinted treated seed, and the rest used fuzzy untreated.  For 2002/03, the
proportion of fuzzy seed is expected to fall to 15%.  10  See Chapter 4 for more detail on the Supplemental Survey
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3.2. Testing, Distribution, and Use of Other Inputs
The bulk of the inputs are distributed by the ginners or their agents.  Each ginner has a
standard package with standard use rules.  These packages and use rules are similar among
the ginners, generally consisting of micro-nutrient (boron) foliar feed, aphicide, bollworm
complex, and buffering solution.  Jassids do not appear to be a serious problem in Zambia
because both varieties in use are relatively hairy.  Due to this hairiness, which also protects
against aphids, Dunavant recommends spraying for aphids only late in the season to avoid
honeydew, which has emerged as a quality concern in Europe. 
One of the major companies is very interested in promoting the use of herbicides on cotton in
Zambia, due to concerns about labor bottlenecks.  Green leaf spot has reduced maize yields
in many areas of the country, requiring households to grow larger areas to meet their needs. 
In addition, livestock has been devastated by foot and mouth disease, especially in Southern
Province, further stretching available household labor.  The company is promoting
“Zamwipe”, essentially a push broom with a tube to apply Roundup or another herbicide to
the brushes through a bag carried by the applicator. This approach seems fast and eliminates
drift, but adoption rates do not appear to be high at this time.  There is also strong interest
among ginners in Bt and Roundup-ready cotton, but Zambia’s biosafety regulations are not
yet sufficiently developed to allow this.
Three public sector bodies have some dealing with testing of products manufactured or
imported into the country, these are the Phytosanitary Unit (PU) of the MACO, the
Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ), and the Zambia Bureau of Standards (ZABS). The
PU is mostly engaged with assessing the suitability of agricultural products, the ECZ is
mostly visible when there is an environmental concern, and ZABS has the mandate to
monitor and set up standards of an almost unlimited range of products. 
The lack of a clear law as to who should test inputs such as fertilizer, herbicides or
insecticides has created a situation where firms import these inputs and sell them with no
central review and approval.  At times firms conduct their own “tests” usually for commercial
effect (CDT 2002).  
All the ginning firms interviewed reported that they supply sprayers to a few farmers. This is
about the only equipment supplied by the firms and it also an imported item. 
3.3. The Farm Level
3.3.1. Technical Advice
The 2000/01 Post Harvest Survey and linked Supplemental Survey
10 included simple
questions on the type and source of technical advice that farmers received during the 1999/00
growing season.  It should be kept in mind that this season coincided with the lowest cotton
production since liberalization in 1994, and was also the first season that Lonrho/Dunavant
was launching its Distributor system.  It therefore seems likely that the results from this
survey reflect a lower level of technical assistance than is currently practiced.  11  The term "conservation farming" covers a wide range of practices.  Haggblade and Tembo (2003) define it as
"a package of several key practices: dry-season land preparation using minimum tillage, ... crop residue
retention, seeding and input application in fixed planting stations ("conservation basins") and nitrogen-fixing
crop rotations." 
12  These authors note that estimates of the number of "spontaneous adopters" is highly imprecise, but that all
evidence points to large increases.
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Dunavant and Clark are known to have worked at developing clear extension messages
emphasizing a few key points, such as “plant early”, “weed early”, and “apply pesticides on
time”.  Results from the Supplemental Survey lend some support to this claim, showing that
company agents explained the proper use of pesticides to 94% of all cotton growers, and
explained the health risks of pesticides to 92% of growers. As a point of comparison, only
19% received such messages from MAFF agents, and about 35% received them from
neighboring farmers.  
Dunavant (and perhaps Clark) promotes conservation farming
11 among all its farmers through
training of Distributors and claims that, where practiced, it contributed substantially to
minimizing the effects of the serious drought during the 2002 growing season on cotton
yields.  The Supplemental Survey suggests that there was little difference in adoption among
cotton growing and non-cotton growing households during the 1999/00 season.  For example,
about 49% of each left residues on the field, and slightly more non-cotton growers use
conservation basins (7.4% vs. 5.3%).  Haggblade and Tembo report that adoption of
conservation farming techniques grew dramatically from 2001/02 to 2002/03, due in large
measure to two successive years of short rains.  They estimate that use of such techniques
grew about 70% among Dunavant cotton farmers – to perhaps 12% of its growers – and by as
much as two or three times among other farmers.
12  Rapid growth across the spectrum of
smallholder farmers – not just cotton growers – is consistent with the fact that both GRZ and
many NGOs have aggressively promoted the techniques, especially since 1999.  
The same authors also demonstrate that Distributor use of conservation farming techniques in
their own fields has a substantial effect on farmers’ use of the same technique. For example,
among Distributors who used conservation basins in their own fields, 24% of their farmers
also used them; this compares to an average of only 8% among farmers whose Distributors
did not use basins.  Among Distributors using rippers, 10% of their farmers also used the
implement, compared to less than 3% among Distributors who did not use it.  These results
suggests that Distributors are engaging in a substantial amount of extension with their
farmers.  
Dunavant has also attempted to promote the use of nitrogen fertilizers in cotton, making it
available for cash purchase at their depots and encouraging Distributors to promote it. These
efforts have met with limited success, for a number of reason.  First, farmers in Zambia have
in the past been told that cotton “does not need” fertilizer, and some local chiefs in fertile
areas apparently will not allow fertilizer into the area for cotton.  The Supplemental Survey
shows cotton growers to be about equally divided between those that believe it is “beneficial
to apply fertilizer to cotton”, those that believe it is not beneficial to do so, and those who
said they do not know.  Also, according to Dunavant field staff, limited experience in the
1999/00 growing season was not positive because extremely heavy rains caused much22
leaching of fertilizer.  An additional difficulty is that past and present policies in Zambia have
used fertilizer as a tool of political patronage, distributing it “on credit” but often not
requiring repayment, thus making it difficult for private companies to profitably sell
fertilizer.  Finally, most research shows that fertilizer application is generally less profitable
on cotton in SSA than it is on maize (Kelly 2000.)
Despite the limited success in promoting fertilizer and herbicide use, it appears that, at least
for the dominant firms in the industry, serious efforts are being made to ensure some level of
extension assistance.  There is also evidence that extension has been quite effective in raising
adoption rates of conservation farming techniques among cotton growers (and others)
Establishing how effective this assistance is in other dimensions awaits further work at the
farm- and distributor levels.
3.3.2. Cotton Production
Provincial data on cotton production are publically available only through the 1998 harvest
(1997/98 cropping season), and only from the Post-Harvest Survey (Table 6).  There is
concern that this survey may substantially overestimate cotton yields in the country, and
underestimate the number of growers, so the data need to be interpreted with caution. 
Nevertheless, these data confirm perceptions from cotton companies and others in the sector
that Eastern Province has emerged as the largest producer of cotton in Zambia in recent
years.  This province also appears to achieve the highest yields, though knowledgeable
observers and ginning companies indicate that yields are lower than indicated by PHS. 
Northern, North Western, and Copper Belt provinces produce little or no cotton.  Nearly all
cotton production is by smallholders, though the larger ginning companies are making some
effort to work with selected large commercial farmers.
3.4. Post-Harvest
3.4.1. Seed Cotton Marketing
Because the only practical means of recovering input credit from farmers is by discounting
the cost of the inputs at the time of purchase, seed cotton marketing has been the focus of
intense conflict within the sector.  As indicated earlier, this conflict began to emerge 2-3
years after liberalization in 1994, associated with low and falling credit repayment rates, and
reached a crisis point during the 1998/99 cropping season.  During the following two
cropping season (1999/00 and 2000/01), credit repayment improved very substantially, may
have reemerged to some extent during the drought-affected 2001/02 season, but improved
again in 2002/03.  13  Clark declines to speak about its input distribution credit recovery system, considering it proprietary
information.
14  Dunavant also uses large meetings of potential growers with Distributors and company staff at the beginning,
middle, and near the end of the cropping seasons to build more direct ties with farmers, extending information
about the company’s practices and policies along with basic extension information.  See section II.B.2 for more
information on training.
23
Table 6. Cotton Production By Province 1993 To 1998 Post Harvest Survey Estimates 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, Zambia
The substantial increase in repayment rates since 1998/99 is associated in time with the rise
of Dunavant’s Distributor System, and of similar systems for Mulungushi and Amaka.
13 
Especially in the case of Dunavant, the system appears to be a serious and well designed
effort to overcome the information problems at the center of the credit repayment challenge
while at the same time building strong relationships with Distributors and, through them,
with farmers.
14  To what extent the improved repayment rates are directly attributable to this
institutional innovation, however, is not clear at this time.  At the same time that Dunavant
was launching and improving its Distributor System, some of the smaller ginners experienced
financial difficulties that reduced their ability to compete in the cotton market.  This alone
may have lead to improved repayment rates for the larger players.  The partial re-emergence
of credit repayment problems in the 2001/02 season is associated with the serious drought,
which reduced cotton yields in Southern and portions of Eastern Province and may have lead15  Interviews with various stakeholders suggest that this competition is especially intense among the two large
players in Eastern Province.
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to more intense competition among ginners for the available cotton
15.  Thus, a key research
question in Zambia is to what extent the Distributor System, especially as practiced by
Dunavant, has been responsible for improved credit repayment and can be expected to
continue to deal effectively with this problem.  
For a number of years the Ginner’s Association, with strong support from Dunavant, has
promoted a “revolving fund” for financing cotton inputs, and linked it to food security by
including selected inputs for maize. The proposal was based in part on the experience in
Uganda. The continuing interest of the Ginners’ Association in this proposal suggests that
they view credit repayment as a continuing source of potential problems, despite the apparent
improvements in recent years.  Experience in Uganda, however, suggests that the revolving
fund is not a panacea for credit repayment problems (Goodland and Gordon 2000; Lundbaek 
2002).  Until recently, the idea garnered little interest in Zambia from government and
donors, and had been put on the back burner by the Association.  With the seating of a new
government in late 2001 more committed to agriculture, the proposal re-emerged in modified
form. Chapter 5 will discuss the resulting Cotton Outgrower Fund in more detail.
3.4.2. Processing of Seed Cotton and Marketing of Lint
About 75% of ginning capacity, and 90% of ginning throughput in 1997/98 in Zambia were
concentrated in Dunavant and Clark Cotton.  Clark’s operations are limited to Eastern
Province, while Dunavant operates in Eastern, Southern, Central, and Lusaka provinces. 
Thus, it seems clear that Dunavant has a dominant market position outside Eastern province,
while within the province the two companies compete only against each other.
All gins in Zambia are saw gins, with an average ginning out-turn ratio of 38%.  All
companies appear to use the official grading system of A, B, and C for seed cotton, though
Dunavant recently added A+.  This company estimates that 60% of the seed cotton arriving
during the 2001 harvest was graded either A or A+, and it maintains strict separation of
grades of seed cotton for ginning.
Dunavant spearheaded what is probably the major success achieved by the cotton sector in
recent years: control of polypropylene contamination.  Until 1999, most cotton in Zambia
was bagged at the farm level using polypropylene bags.  Fibers from these bags then entered
the seed cotton and remained in the cotton lint.  Since the polypropylene fibers will not
accept dyes, lint contaminated in this way received substantial discounts among buyers in
Europe.  Dunavant addressed this problem in two ways.  First, they informed farmers that
they would not accept cotton arriving at buying stations in anything other than plastic bags. 
Second, they designed cleaning stations at the entrance of gins, essentially slow moving
conveyor belts at which women were seated, finding and manually removing polypropylene
fibers.  Dunavant indicates that, while some contamination remains, it has been dramatically
reduced and is no longer considered a major problem by European buyers. We do not know
at this point in time whether other companies have similar practices regarding polypropylene.25
Grading of lint cotton export is based on a two digit system, the first digit referring to
brightness (0=best, 5=worst) and the second digit referring to length (1=shortest, 5=longest). 
Thus, the best quality is 05.  Each bale is graded in this way prior to export.  At the present
time there is no HVI equipment in Zambia for more thorough testing of lint quality.
The two largest ginners (Dunavant and Clark) devote over 90% of their lint for export while
the smaller gins devote over 70% of the lint for local consumption. Mulungushi and Mukuba,
being owners of spinning plants, devote 100% of their production to their spinning plants. 
Historically, exports by Dunavant have been destined primarily to Europe, while Clark seems
to supply the South African market (personal communications).  The U.S. Africa Growth and
Opportunities Act (AGOA) has resulted in significant foreign investment in spinning and
garment making in South Africa, Mauritius, and Madagascar, suggesting that these countries
may become more important export markets for Zambian cotton in the near future.
3.4.3. Marketing of Seed and Other Sub-products
All the ginners interviewed reported that they devote about 10% of the seed from gins for
redistribution and sell about 80-90% to local oil processors. The bulk of the yarn (over 90%)
produced by the spinners is usually destined for the export market. The rest is retained for
weaving into cloth-mainly ‘chitenge’ material and blankets (Ministry of Agriculture, Food
and Fisheries 2000).16  CSAs are the sampling unit immediately above the primary sampling unit in CSO’s sample frame.  See
FSRP Working Paper No. 2 for more detail.
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4.  COTTON IN SMALLHOLDER LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES
In March 2001, the Food Security Research Project in Zambia conducted a “Supplemental
Survey” to the Post Harvest Survey (PHS) carried out annually by Zambia’s Central
Statistical Office (CSO).  The Supplemental Survey linked to the October 2000 PHS, which
covered the 1999/00 cropping season.  Thus, Supplemental Survey results pertain to that
year.  Final data files from the Supplemental Survey include 6,924 of the 7,699 households in
the final PHS sample. The 776 missing households are due to either incomplete or extreme
data on household incomes.
The PHS collects basic data on crop production and practices.  The supplemental survey used
these data, adding sections on household demography, crop marketing behavior, livestock,
and off-farm income, among others.  In this chapter, we use the combined data bases to
characterize the role of cotton in the livelihood strategies of rural households in Zambia.  To
ensure comparability among cotton- and non-cotton growing households, analysis is limited
to Census Supervisory Areas (CSAs) that had at least one cotton grower; CSAs with no
cotton growers were not included.
16
4.1. Geographical Distribution of Growers
Over 95% of cotton growers are found in Eastern, Central, and Southern provinces, with
Eastern accounting for about 60% of all growers.  Based on earlier PHSs, the proportion of
all households involved in cotton fell from just under 30% in 1997/98 and 1998/99, to 23% in
1999/00.  These results are consistent with other data on cotton production, and reflect the
crisis that the sector suffered during that year.  Since that time, it is known that the number of
households involved in cotton production has increased dramatically (see also Table 1).
4.2. Characteristics of Cotton- and Non-Cotton Growing Households
Table 7 below divides the small-holder farming sector into households growing cotton and
households that did not grow cotton in the 1999/00 growing season and gives the mean
values of demographic, agricultural and asset indicators for each of the two groups.  Only
CSAs with at least one cotton grower are included in the analysis.
With regard to demographic indicators, the mean number of members in households growing
cotton is 6.6, 10% higher than those not growing cotton (6.0).  The number of adults 13-64 is
also higher for cotton growing households, and the proportion of female headed households
is substantially higher among those not growing cotton (24.6% compared to 13.6%).  These
patterns together suggest that households growing cotton tend to have more family labor
available to them, which is consistent with results typically found in other countries.  The
heads of cotton growing households do not appear typically to be older than other household
heads, but may have slightly more education (5.2 years versus 4.8 for non-growing
households).27
Agricultural indicators show that households growing cotton have access to about 1.5 ha
more than non-growing households, and dedicate about one additional ha to annual crops. 
Thus, cotton growing households appear to fallow at least as much land as non-growing
households.  Despite cropping more land, cotton households were only slightly more likely to
use animal traction.  Mean area in maize and total production of maize are both nearly
identical among cotton and non-cotton households, as is the probability of using fertilizer. 
Note that fertilizer is seldom used on cotton in Zambia; nearly all reported use will be on
maize or horticultural crops.  Thus, cotton growing households do not appear to be sacrificing
maize production in favor of cotton
Table 7. Selected Indicators for Cotton Growing and Non-cotton Growing Households
in Zambia, 1999/00 Growing Season
Indicators
Cotton Growing Status
HH Grows Cotton HH does not Grow
Cotton
Demographics
Household size 6.6 6.0
... of which adults 13-64 3.6 3.2
Female headed (%) 13.6 24.6
Age of head of hh (years) 42 44
Education of head of hh (years) 5.2 4.8
Agriculture
Land Holdings (ha) 3.8 2.4
Land cropped (ha) 2.7 1.6
... of which maize 1.2 1.2
... of which cotton 0.6 0.0
Per capita maize production (kg) 359 368
HH used animal traction 50.8 47.0
HH used fertilizer 65.4 69.4
Assets (% owning/using)
HH owns a bicycle 65.5 44.3
HH owns a radio 50.0 31.1
HH home has an improved roof 13.5 13.1
HH home has brick or concrete block walls 16.2 18.6
HH home has cement floor 13.9 14.828
Cotton growing households are substantially more likely to own bicycles and radios than
non-growing households but, perhaps surprisingly, they are no more likely to have improved
roofing material or walls or floors in their homes.  
Cotton growing households enjoyed incomes 50% higher than non growing households in
1999/00, and were heavily dependent on their cropping activities for this income; on average,
about 15% of income came from off-farm activities or remittances for cotton growing
households, compared to 25% for non-cotton households (Table 8).  Similar results showing
cotton growing households earning less income off-farm have been found earlier in
Mozambique (Tschirley and Weber 1994).  
Table 8. Income Levels and Shares for Cotton and Non-cotton Growing Households in
Zambia, 1999/00 Growing Season
Income/Income share
Cotton Growing Status
HH Grows Cotton HH does not Grow
Cotton
Mean HH Income (‘000 Zkw) 2,016 1,339
HH Income Share (%) from ...
... Crop production 81.4 70.8
... Livestock 4.3 4.8
... Business 7.6 10.6
... Salary/Wage 4.6 9.8
... Remittance 2.0 3.8
In summary, cotton growing households are distinguished from their non-cotton growing
neighbors primarily by having more family labor and more land to cultivate.  They dedicate
most of this additional land to cotton while continuing fallow land, and earn higher incomes
primarily as a result of growing this crop.  This income is reflected in higher holdings of
assets such as bicycles and radios, but does not appear to have been invested systematically
in improvements in family homes.  Because cotton growing households have higher land
holdings, they do not appear to sacrifice maize production in favor of cotton.
4.3. Profitability of Cotton
When the cotton sector in Zambia was first reformed in the mid-1990s, the very high
international prices for cotton lint allowed ginners to pay attractive prices to farmers, and
likely made cotton growing a highly profitable enterprise for both companies and small
farmers.  The long-term decline in world prices since 1995 may have undermined this
profitability, given that prices of seed cotton in Zambia have fallen from US$0.56/kg in 1995
to an average of US$0.225/kg over the past three harvest seasons (2001-2003).17  Input costs from Haggblade and Tembo are comparable to those indicated by Dunavant.
18  It should also be noted that maize yields from Haggblade and Tembo are above those reported by ACF
(2002), based on MACO data.  ACF reports average yields from 1997 through 1999 of about 1,350 kg/ha, vs
the weighted average of 1,768 in Haggblade and Tembo.  Even at these lower yield levels, however, maize
appears more financially profitable than cotton, assuming effective marketing.
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Table 9 presents synthetic budgets for cotton and maize over the past three seasons.  Cotton
yields are from Dunavant, while purchased inputs and labor days for both crops (and yields
for maize) are weighted averages from Haggblade and Tembo over four technology types.
17 
Returns to labor are calculated as gross margin divided by number of days of labor on the
crop, without subtracting any charge for land.  Results suggest that, during the past three
years, farmers who were able to sell all their maize crop at going market prices were better
off devoting their land to that crop.  Maize’s advantage diminished in 2003 due to the
improved cotton price, and may diminish further in 2004 if the very high international cotton
prices of November 2003 persist.  At yield levels of 900-1,000 kg/ha reported by both
Dunavant and Clark in Eastern province, cotton generates returns slightly above those for
maize at 2003price levels for both crops.  One must also keep in mind that the marketing of
maize is far more risky than that of cotton; in the latter case, as long as the quality is
acceptable, sale at the announced company price is guaranteed for most farmers.  Access to
inputs on credit for cotton is also a major advantage for frequently cash-constrained
smallholder farmers.  Thus, point in time profitability analysis, while very important, is only
one aspect that should be considered in evaluating the attractiveness of cotton for these
farmers.  Given the rapid recovery in the number of cotton growers since the decline of 1999,
it is apparent that many of them place great value on the input credit and the guaranteed
output market for that crop.
18





Cotton Maize Cotton Maize Cotton Maize
Yield (kg/ha) 600 1,763 630 1,763 660 1,763
Price (Zkw/kg) 840 421 860 582 1,220 517
Gross Revenue (Zkw//ha) 504,000 742,223 541,800 1,026,066 805,200 911,471
Purchased input costs (Zkw//ha) 221,261 166,590 234,432 176,506 248,608 187,180
Gross margin (Zkw//ha) 282,739 575,633 307,368 849,560 556,592 724,291
Labor days  130 107 130 107 130 107
Returns to labor (Zkw/day) 2,175 5,380 2,364 7,940 4,281 6,769
Exchange Rate (Zkw/$) 4,200 4,200 4,450 4,450 5,000 5,000
Returns to labor (US$/day) 0.52 1.28 0.53 1.78 0.86 1.35
Using slightly different assumptions on input costs and labor days, Poulton et al. compare
returns to labor and land for cotton across Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia30
 
Seed  Cotton  Price  (US$/kg)       
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  Mean 
  Tanzania  0.27 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.22 
  Zimbabwe  0.24 0.39 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.25 
  Mozambique  0.25 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.16 
  Zambia  0.29 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.22 
          
Returns  to  Land  (US$/ha)        
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  Mean 
  Tanzania  56 95 98 67 94 82 
  Zimbabwe  157 272 261 113  40 166 
  Mozambique  93 68 31 29 32 51 
  Zambia  105 53 73 98 75 81 
         
Returns to Labor (US$/family labor day)         
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  Mean 
  Tanzania  0.56 0.95 0.98 0.67 0.94 0.82 
  Zimbabwe  1.31 2.27 2.17 0.94 0.40 1.39 
  Mozambique  0.93 0.68 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.51 
  Zambia  1.05 0.53 0.73 0.98 0.75 0.81 
 
Table 10. Seed Cotton Prices, Returns to Land, and Returns to Labor in Four
Eastern and Southern African Countries, 1998-2002
(Table 10).  Returns to labor are calculated as in Table 9; returns to land are gross margins
per ha without any charges for family labor.  Until 2002, when drought and depressed prices
reduced cotton’s profitability, Zimbabwe clearly stands out for generating the highest returns
to farmers.  As stated by Poulton et al, “The 2001 figures show that, even with weak prices,
the Zimbabwe sector can generate higher returns to producers than those obtained in the other
countries, because of the higher yields achieved”.  
Tanzania and Zambia provide an especially interesting comparison.  Input supply in Tanzania 
largely collapsed with the liberal reforms in the sector beginning in 1994, and competition for
seed cotton is intense.  Prices paid to farmers in Tanzania have been comparable to those paid
in Zambia, while yields in the latter have been higher, due to higher input use.  Nonetheless,
the higher yields in Zambia have been insufficient to substantially increase profitability to
farmers: returns to land and labor in the two countries have been comparable over the past
five years.  This suggests that Zambia will require some additional years of sustained growth
in cotton yields for the current technology package to clearly generate higher returns to
farmers.  31
5.  RECENT POLICY INITIATIVES
This chapter deals with three key policy initiatives which have emerged over the past two
years in Zambia’s cotton sector: the proposed creation of a Cotton Board, government’s
recent support to input credit provision for smallholder producers of selected cash crops,
including cotton, and the emergence in 2003 of District Council levies as a point of conflict
between local governments and cotton companies.
5.1. The Proposed Cotton Act
Beginning as early as 2000, Dunavant began working with CDT and other stakeholders in the
cotton sector to develop a regulatory framework that would allow the orderly development of
the sector over time.  A key concern which drove this process was avoiding a repeat of the
credit default crisis that nearly destroyed the sector from 1997 through 1999.  The central
provision in the proposed Cotton Act is the creation of a Cotton Board with broad regulatory
powers.  This section reviews the basic provisions of the act, its current status, and key issues
which need to be considered in reviewing the proposed act.  
5.1.1. Basic Provisions of the Act
The proposed Act establishes a Cotton Board with nine voting members, appointed by the
Minister of MACO upon nomination by their own institution.  Members are the PS of
MACO, two persons each from CDT, the Cotton Ginners’ Association, and the Cotton
Growers’ Association, the Controller of Seeds (one person), and one person from the
Environmental Council of Zambia.  The Board would have no authority to set prices nor to
directly engage in marketing behavior.  Rather, its stated functions are regulatory and
advisory.  Specific stated functions of the Board are to:
• Regulate the production, processing, and marketing of cotton, 
• Advise government on regulations and policies related to the sector, 
• Monitor and report on implementation of policies and matters related to the
sector, and 
•“ Carry out such activities as are necessary ... to the better performance of its
functions”
All decisions of the Board are by majority vote of those present.  A quorum is 2/3 of
appointed members.  Specific guidelines are provided for providing notice of the calling of
meetings.  The Board can create committees of its choosing, and appoint people from outside
the Board to serve on those committees.  The Act has strong provisions against the revealing
of information obtained through carrying out duties under the Act.  Penalties include five
thousand “penalty units” and up to six months in jail. (Part III, section 14).
Key sections of the proposed Act are on licensing (Part III, section 15) and registration (Part
IV).  The Board will have a Cotton Licensing Committee of not more than seven members. 
Functions of the Licensing Committee are to issue certificates and licenses, approve
“distinguishing marks” (company trademarks), and maintain data bases on land planted with
cotton, registered cotton growers, and distinguishing marks.  The proposed Act stipulates that19  "Pirate buying" is not defined in the Act, and the difference between it and "buying pre-financed cotton
without authorization from the financer" is not clear.
20  The proposed Cotton Act is a legal document and as such requires legal expertise for a full assessment. Here
we raise key issues from a public policy standpoint.  
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“any person dealing in cotton” must be registered, and must pay a fee for registration, and
that any cotton leaving a registered ginner must have the distinguishing mark clearly shown
(subsection 30.1).  Licensing is specified for cotton ginners, cotton seed sellers, cotton seed
producers, Inspectors, and “any other license which the Board may prescribe”
The Board may refuse to register a person “giving reasons in writing” if it is “satisfied that
the applicant or a person employed by the applicant does not have sufficient knowledge or
experience in the cotton trade” (emphasis added, Part VI, subsection 33.3).  No criteria are
provided as a basis for making such a judgement.  All licence holders must maintain records
on cotton transactions, which “shall be open to inspection at all reasonable times, by the
Board ...” (Part VI section 35).  Once granted, registrations can be cancelled by the Board for,
among other reasons, buying pre-financed cotton without authorization from the financer,
engaging in “pirate buying”
19, or engaging in “any other activity not registered with the
Board”.  
Cotton Board Inspectors must show their identification upon demand (Part VIII, subsection
43.3), and must provide a receipt prior to the seizure of any item, but have very broad
powers.  These include the power to:
1. Enter and search any premise and seize and remove any cotton based on
“reasonable cause”
2. Stop, search, and detain any vehicle based on “reason to believe ...”
3. Inspect all records related to cotton
4. Arrest and detain based on reasonable suspicion.
5. Seize machinery or material if he believes an offense has been committed or is
likely to be committed (emphasis added; section 44.1.c)
The Act appears to prohibit appeal of Board decisions to Courts.  The appeals procedure is
first to the Board, then to the Minister.  No further appeals are possible.  (See subsections
IV.22.2 and VI.37.4).
The Act provides the Board with the ability to raise funds through Parliamentary
appropriations, fees, grants, donations, and loans, and stipulates the establishment of a Cotton
Development Trust Fund, to be used for various technical activities (Part VII, Subsection 39).
5.1.2. Assessment
20 
The proposed Cotton Act appears focused on two issues of great importance to any export
industry attempting seriously to engage in contract farming with smallholder farmers: credit
repayment and product quality.  Each of these aspects can be negatively affected when large
numbers of cotton buyers operate in the sector, especially if some of these do not have long-21  For example, varietal zoning agreements are important to maintain varietal purity over time; collective action
which by definition limits the freedom of individual actors is often needed to avoid contamination of cotton
with synthetic fibers; voluntary levies are often an effective means to finance research into varietal and other
improvements to raise productivity; increased farm level productivity also depends on sustained improvements
in farmer management practices over time, which require investments in farmer training.  Firms promoting
strategic default by farmers are unlikely to support many of these efforts.
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term commitments to the sector.  Buyers who do not provide input credit to farmers can offer
more attractive prices and thus promote strategic default by farmers – decisions to not repay
their loan despite sufficient production to do so.  These same buyers are unlikely to pay
attention to the careful post-harvest practices needed to ensure high quality cotton for export,
nor are they likely to abide by the agreements nor support the long-term efforts needed to
increase productivity in the sector.
21  
Viewed in this context, efforts to impose some level of control over who can operate in a
cotton sector are understandable.  Too many players with too little long-term commitment to
the sector can destroy any possibility for long-term development.  Yet it must also be
recognized, first, that abuses can be committed not only by new and potentially fleeting
players, but also by established players who have accumulated too much power in the sector
and may over time come to favor short-term profits over long-term development.  Second,
some level of competition among players is probably necessary to promote private sector
innovation that reduces costs, increases value-added in the sector, and distributes this value-
added widely enough that smallholder farmers engaged in the activity can earn sustained
profits and escape poverty.  Finally, regulation has costs as well as benefits, and a successful
industry will keep its eye on reducing the costs of – and need for – formal regulation by
investing in relationships that increase trust, especially between smallholder farmers and the
much larger industrial buyers.  The challenge, then, is to devise a regulatory approach that is
workable, that has sufficient “teeth” to impose effective penalties but does so only when
strictly needed, that is balanced enough to avoid capture by large established players, and that
builds trust among players over time.
From this perspective, the Act’s heavy emphasis on policing provides reason for serious
concern.  The Act grants very broad policing powers to the Cotton Board, creating in fact a
parallel police force, uses vague language in specifying the conditions under which these
powers can be exercised, and attempts to insulate decisions of the Board from judicial
review.  It also transfers powers and responsibilities reasonably within the mandate of
MACO to an agency another step away from political accountability.  This combination of
characteristics suggests that the Board’s powers could easily be abused, especially if the
sector becomes more concentrated than it already is.  The membership of the Board appears
balanced, and its size – nine members – may make it difficult to attain a majority for hard line
positions.  Yet a quorum is only six, and it is of course impossible to predict how shifting
alliances and power balances in the sector may play themselves out in any given vote.
The tone of the Act, and the powers proposed for the Board and its Inspectors, suggest not
only that its design has been heavily influenced by the credit repayment crisis of the late
1990s, but also by a vision of the sector that emphasizes regulation and mandated orderly
processes at the potential expense of competition and innovation.  Given that the sector has
emerged from the crisis of the 1990s due in large measure to the institutional innovations and22  The Act does mandate that the Board shall maintain data bases on land planted with cotton and registered
cotton growers, among other items.  Yet it does not tie this function into efforts to address credit repayment
problems.  
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improved management that emerged from competition between the two major players, one
might ask why such a potentially restrictive regulatory framework – and one open to serious
potential abuse – is needed at this point in time.  More specifically, one should ask, first,
whether it will it be possible to implement such an approach in Zambia, or whether the
regulatory and policing burden will be more than the Board can handle.  Second, even if it is
possible to implement, will this approach be in the best interests of the cotton sector and the
broader society?  Finally, are there other approaches that may simultaneously be less
intrusive and more effective?
Definitive answers to the first two questions are beyond the scope of this paper.  We suggest,
however, that the regulations may be very costly to apply in practice and hold the possibility
of serious abuse if they are effectively applied.  In short, we suggest that the public good
would be better served by alternative approaches that rely less on policing powers and focus
more on facilitating solutions to root causes of the sector’s difficulties.
5.1.3. Alternative Approaches
The proposed Act is noticeably missing any serious treatment of the problems of information
and collective action to improve credit repayment, quality, and productivity
22.  The problem
of assuring credit repayment is in large part a problem of the cost of information regarding
the credit worthiness of farmers.  Collective action – some voluntary but some likely
requiring legal sanction – is key to resolving this problem, and is also necessary to conceive,
finance, and ensure adherence to procedures and programs to improve the quality of cotton
for export and productivity at the farm and ginning levels.  While the Dunavant Distributor
System (and perhaps Clark’s less well known approach) has been remarkably successful
reducing default and improving quality and productivity, the system likely remains costly,
and apparent credit repayment rates of 85-90% remain well below levels that a purely
financial institution would consider acceptable.  
All companies could achieve higher repayment rates at lower cost if the sector were able to
operate some kind of effective credit bureau – a clearinghouse for information on the credit
status of borrowers.  Credit bureaus can take many forms, from largely voluntary informal
sharing of information among firms in a sector to legally mandated reporting and public
availability of information on delinquencies and defaults. While the institutional and legal
challenges of establishing a workable credit bureau are substantial, such an approach holds
the prospect of providing a much lower cost solution to the credit repayment problem than
does a heavy regulatory approach as embodied in the proposed Act. 
The Act does stipulate the creation of a Cotton Development Trust Fund for technical
activities, which is a positive step.  This section would be strengthened if specific
mechanisms were proposed for the sector to generate funds from within itself to finance
programs to improve quality and productivity, e.g., ginning or export levies.  35
Well functioning commodity sectors have the ability to generate regular and reliable
information about key aspects of sector performance beyond credit histories of borrowers. 
Such information is currently very difficult to obtain.  Examples of key information which
should be regularly and publically available include costs of production and profitability of
the crop relative to alternatives in production, an assessment of key bottlenecks that increase
costs and reduce profitability, international price levels and forecasts, trends in input use and
yields relative to neighboring countries, number of producers, and total production. 
Providing such information in a reliable fashion requires collaboration between public and
private sectors.  The Act should include a proposal for the institutional home and operational
mechanisms to provide such information.
Another point that the Cotton Act could consider is to have programs to improve grower’s
capacities to negotiate and sign informed contracts. Such an effort is especially important in
light of the near-monoposony positions of the major buyers in many areas of the country, and
the fact that most smallholders are small farmers with very limited education.  This may
require that the Board works with associations such a well functioning Cotton Growers
Association to facilitate group formation.
In summary, this review suggests the following.  First, the concept of bringing together
formally a broad set of stakeholders in the cotton sector to grapple with key sectoral
development issues has great merit.  Properly focused, such a group could play a central role
mobilizing resources and political will to make the types of long-term investments in
productivity and quality that are crucial for the sector’s continued success.  Second, however,
the current heavy focus of the proposed Cotton Act on policing is inappropriate.  If approved
in its current form, the Act would create an institution with its own policing powers, vaguely
defined limits on those powers, relatively little political oversight, and no judicial oversight. 
The probability of abuse in such an organization operating within the Zambian context is
prohibitively high.  Third, and as a result of these concerns, if sector leaders remain
committed to the creation of a Cotton Board, its focus should be shifted from policing and
controlling the sector to facilitating collective solutions to the sector’s chief problems.  Any
policing powers considered absolutely essential should be well defined, limited in scope, and
subject to normal political oversight and judicial review.  
The sector needs seriously to deal with at least four issues that are either ignored or treated
very briefly in the proposed Act.  A redesigned Cotton Board could play a key role in
addressing these issues by:
• Developing legal bases and operational approaches to improve information on
borrowers’ credit history.  The Board could then operate or help oversee the operation
of any resulting credit bureau; 
• Promoting collective action for specific procedures and programs to improve cotton
quality.  The objective should be to develop a system of grades and standards and set
of operational procedures that help create a Zambian cotton “brand” and maximize its
acceptability in international markets, much as Zimbabwe did in the 1980s and 23  Careful attention to cotton quality in Zimbabwe generated a reputation in international markets for high and
homogeneous lint quality, resulting in a premium above Index A of about 10%.  The procedures and practices
that generated this reputation began under the single channel system but were maintained well into the reform
period.  More recently, there is concern that quality may be undermined by the general economic crisis in the
country and the entrance many new players into the cotton sector.  See Poulton et al. for more information.
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1990s.
23  The board could offer testing and grading services charging a fee to the
buyers or get an appropriation for the service.  
• Promoting collective action for programs to improve cotton productivity at farm and
ginning levels.  The CDT is already well placed to carry out such activities, so Cotton
Board actions should focus on improving CDT’s ability to do this job.  The Board
could play an advisory role towards CDT and, through its broad-based membership,
generate political support for funding of its activities through a mixture of
appropriations, levies, and fees.
• Proposing a specific institutional home and operational mechanisms to improve the
monitoring of sector performance beyond credit repayment.  The Board itself may be
the most appropriate institutional home for this activity, as the process of generating
monitoring information will yield insights that help refine existing programs and
develop new ones that respond to the sector’s evolving needs.
• Advising government on policy and programs that will affect the sector’s
performance.  For example, the Board could generate research and position papers
regarding the impacts of maize and fertilizer policy on the production of cotton and
other cash crops, and thus on the country’s foreign trade balance.  It could critically
review the performance of the Cotton Outgrower Scheme and suggest adjustments to
improve its effectiveness.  It could review problematical macro policies and highlight
for policy makers their effects on the agricultural sector in general and the cotton
sector in particular.  These activities would be a natural extension of the monitoring
responsibilities proposed in the previous point.
5.2. Cotton Outgrower Fund
In January 2002, Zambia elected a new President to replace Fredrick Chiluba, who had
served his constitutional maximum of two terms.  The new president, despite being from the
same party and having some of the same people in his government, appeared to favor a more
activist policy with regard to agriculture. Around the same time a proposal spearheaded by
the Cotton Ginners’ Association to promote food security through cotton was being presented
at various fora including the Minister of Agriculture’s office. The main provision of the
proposal was that government would provide around US$2,000,000 to ginning companies
which would be used to fund credit schemes for outgrowers with the package being a blend
of cotton and maize inputs. It is not clear what effect this proposal had on the plans of the
government, but during the President’s inaugural speech at the opening of parliament it was
revealed that the government was setting up a scheme to provide funds for on-lending to
farmers for various crops, not just cotton. 37
5.2.1. Objectives and Operation of the Scheme
The main objective of the new initiative was to increase the number of farmers growing cash
crops by increasing the amount of money available to finance inputs. According to CDT, an
additional objective in the cotton scheme was to reduce pirate buying. The logic was that if
firms received low cost funds from government to lend out to farmers, and if they understood
that these funds could be terminated if they did not play by the rules, they would be less
tempted to pirate buy and would instead focus on building effective relationships with
farmers and recovering their loans.
The total amount for the scheme was originally ZK 15 billion (about US$3.5 million) of
which the cotton sector was to receive ZK 3.5 billion (about US$800,000). Government
identified the Cotton Development Trust as the vehicle to deliver these funds to the cotton
sector. Several discussions were held between CDT and the Zambia Cotton Ginners’
Association The initial idea was to on-lend these funds to all the Ginners at an interest rate of
between 13% and 15% on what CDT termed a pro-rata basis, a proportion of the crop
processed by each ginner. In the end the available money was lent only to two ginners:
Dunavant and Continental Ginneries in Livingstone. Some ginning companies refused to take
part in the scheme namely Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles and Mukuba Textiles. Clark
Cotton, the second biggest cotton company in Zambia, was excluded because its location,
Eastern province, was not in the pilot scheme in the year 2002.
Government signed a contract with CDT stipulating that the funds would be lent to CDT at
8% annual interest. Twenty percent of the total amount was a grant to CDT for mobilization
but the CDT board resolved that all the funds should be given to the participating ginners.
Government released ZK 450m in a first tranche in August 2002. The next tranche of  ZK
650 million was released in December 2002. No further funds were released which meant
that only ZK 1.1b of the planned ZK 3.5b had been released. Dunavant received close to ZK
1 billion while Continental Ginneries received the balance. CDT reports that payments are on
schedule and that the last payment is expected in January, 2004.
The late disbursement of these funds, where the major amount was released in December
2002 as opposed to October, reduced the effectiveness of the scheme. The amount released is
also small, representing about 5% of what Dunavant alone lent out in the 2002/2003 season.
CDT has planned for a scheme of ZK 2.2b for the 2003/2004 agricultural season, and plans to
include all ginning firms including Clark Cotton. MACO reports that the Cotton Growers
Association have applied to be the host of the funds. MACO has requested a list of members,
legal status and audited accounts of the association before they could be considered. These
items have not been provided and as such MACO has written to CDT to inform them that
they would continue to be the host of the funds in the 2004 season. Close to ZK1 billion has
been raised for the scheme this season and has already been transferred. The balance is to
come from the recoveries.38
5.2.2. Key  Issues
To date the scheme has avoided the error of centralizing input procurement and distribution
to farmers within itself.  By channeling credit to private cotton companies already working
with farmers and allowing them full freedom on how to use it, the scheme essentially
becomes a means to increase lendable funds in the system and reduce borrowing costs for the
companies.  By attempting to involve all major firms in the sector in the scheme, it may
create some leverage to discourage pirate buying, and also promote an attitude among buyers
that could have similar effects.  
A further potential benefit of the scheme may be in helping smaller firms remain in the
market while at the same time giving them a vested interest in playing by the rules.  As
mentioned in the previous section, a major risk in allowing new, often small entrants into the
cotton sector is that they may have little long-term investment in the sector and may,
together, create major credit repayment problems that undermine the entire enterprise.  At the
same time, we have argued that some level of workable competition is probably needed to
stimulate private institutional innovations that improve quality and productivity while sharing
profits equitably and sustainably with farmers.  Thus, it would have to be considered a major
policy success if the Cotton Outgrower Credit Scheme succeeds in helping smaller firms
remain in the market while providing input credit and not engaging in pirate buying.  As a
condition of participating in the loan program a Ginner could be required to maintain open
records of loans to growers and their repayment.
The scheme would benefit from clarification of at least three key questions. First, what
precisely is its purpose?  Purposes which have been explicitly mentioned by players are
increasing lendable funds in the sector, reducing the cost of borrowing for cotton companies,
and reducing pirate buying.  An additional original intention was to use 20% of the fund’s
assets to capitalize CDT, but at least during the first year this objective was dropped.  We
have suggested that a perhaps unrecognized but potentially important benefit relates to the
effect of the scheme on the structure of the industry at the ginner/first buyer level.  CDT, the
cotton companies, and MACO would be well served by clarifying and prioritizing precisely
what the objectives of the scheme are.
Second, will the scheme be financed with a revolving fund, or will it rely on new
appropriations every year?  A revolving fund would provide much greater stability for the
Scheme, as long as the resources were managed properly and transparently.  If such
management cannot be reasonably assured, then recurring appropriations are probably the
best funding option.  Yet such a design leaves the scheme vulnerable to political and
budgetary changes, and for that reason would probably undermine strong commitment by key
players in the sector.  To date, the scheme has not been managed as a revolving fund:  CDT
was required to fully repay the ZK1.1b after the first year and receive a new appropriation of
ZK 2.2b.  It seems imperative to these authors that a strong and transparent management
structure be put in place so that the scheme can begin operating as a revolving fund.
Finally, what criteria should be used in deciding each firm’s eligibility and their share of the
financial resources?  It is critically important that the program not be turned into a credit
“give away”.  Thus, one key criterion for eligibility must be the ability of the firm to repay
the loan.  This will depend upon the ginner’s ability to set up a lending organization of agents39
with knowledge of growers and their ability and inclination to repay loans, and an incentive
for the agents to get the repayments.  This implies that CDT must make some impartial
assessment, based on criteria agreed to by the Ginners’ Association, of the effectiveness of a
company’s input credit disbursement and collection system prior to granting eligibility.  Once
eligibility is granted, each company’s share of the resources should also be based on
transparent criteria agreed to by CDT and the Ginners’ Association.  During the program’s
first year, Dunavant received nearly 90% of all funds.  It is likely that with the new funding
of ZK2.2b and presumed entrance of Clark and other companies, Dunavant’s share will fall
substantially. 
5.3. District Council Levies
The levying of fees on crops traded within a district or across its borders became a point of
intense conflict between some local governments and cotton companies in early 2003 when it
came to light that Chadiza District in Eastern Province had raised its levy on cotton from
ZK5/kg to ZK100/kg.  The ensuing negotiations between cotton companies and Chadiza, and
reactions by some other Districts, have raised important issues about mechanisms of public
finance at the local level and impacts on economic activity and smallholder farmer incomes.
5.3.1. Operation of the Levies
According to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), district councils in
Zambia have for many years had the power to set levies on the sale of agricultural produce
within their districts or its transport out of their district. This power was made more explicit
in the Local Government Act of 1991, passed under a new, democratically elected
government with an agenda to cut subsidies, liberalize markets, and devolve decision making
power to the local level.  Under the new government, funding levels from central government
to local councils declined, meaning that Councils felt greater need to exercise their
strengthened powers to raise funds.  Given the relative lack of non-farm economic
development in rural areas, agricultural produce levies have been the primary tool at their
disposal.
The interpretation of the agricultural levies by all councils in Zambia is that they are charged
on any agricultural produce grown and sold within the district, or transported out of the
district.  Indications are that, prior to the 2003 marketing season, levies on cotton were
uniform across districts at ZK5/kg, though it is not clear that all districts collected the levies
on all marketed crops.  In January 2002, Chadiza District gained approval from MLGH for
Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 2002, in which it established new levies for maize, paprika,
cassava and potatoes (grouped together), cotton, tobacco, tomato, cabbage, and watermelon. 
The value of the levy per kilogram, and the implicit percentage levy, varied widely.  For
cotton, the levy was set at ZK100/kg, higher than for any crop except tobacco, which was set
at ZK300/kg.  
Local businesses appear to have been unaware of the new levy schedule at the time it was
passed, and the Chadiza District Council did not charge the levy at the time the crops were
marketed.  Instead, it provided businesses with demand notices in November 2002 (after the40
close of the marketing season) regarding the total value of 2002 levies due.  In February
2003, an ad hoc group composed of representatives of Clark Cotton, Dunavant, Stancom
(tobacco), Dimon Zambia (tobacco), and a local petrol filling station formally protested the
new levies and requested that the District Council reconsider them.  The cotton and tobacco
companies emphasized that they would fully pass the levy on to the producer, reducing the
price they pay by the amount of the levy.  In April, the Council reduced levies on cotton to
ZK40/kg, and to ZK70/kg for tobacco.  Levies on other crops remained largely unchanged,
except for maize, whose levy was raised from ZK 300 per 50 kg bag to ZK 3,000.  It remains
unclear whether businesses were obliged to pay the full value of the originally assessed 2002
levies.
Interviews with Dunavant and MLGH officials indicate that all other districts are charging
levies of ZK 10/kg, or 1% of the anticipated price of cotton at the time they were set (the
actual prevailing price is about ZK 1,200/kg).  However, interviews with Ministry of Local
Government and Housing (MLGH) reveal that Katete District Council gained approval for its
revised by-laws in June, 2003, raising the cotton levy to ZK 200 per kilogram for cotton seed
and ZK 100 for raw cotton. These new rates will not take effect until the by-laws are printed
and circulated by the Government Printing Office. As of September 2003 there were no other
by-laws on cotton or other crops pending approval by MLGH.  
Table 11 shows the number of Dunavant farmers in each District of the country, and the
potential revenue that each District could collect from its levies.  It assumes that the Katete
levy of ZK100/kg will remain in place.  Potential revenue from Clark Cotton in Eastern is
likely to be in the range of that for Dunavant: about US$350,000, coming primarily from
Katete and Chadiza.  These are substantial sums of money for District Councils which have
few other sources of public revenue.
5.3.2. Key Issues
These events raise several issues.  The first is a narrow procedural issue, regarding the way in
which the levies were passed.  District Councils are required by law to post proposed bills on
a notice board at the district offices for three months, and to take comments on them during
that time.  Companies interviewed indicated that this procedure had not been followed; the
fact that they raised no protests until 13 months after the final printing of the Chadiza statute
would seem to support their contention.  MLGH reports, however, that in their view all
procedures required to pass a law as spelled out in the Local Government Act have been
followed. 
While full clarity on what procedures were followed may never be attained, it does seem
clear that local governments have incentives to be less than transparent when proposing such
actions, due to the economic power wielded by large agro-industrial companies in poor rural
areas.  It is perhaps telling that Chadiza levies were reduced by 60% for cotton and 77% for
tobacco, while they were raised by a factor of 10 on maize; the latter is traded primarily by
small traders with little ability to organize and make their voice heard in government.  From
the Council’s perspective, however, maize is also a much less attractive crop to levy, because
only a portion of it is marketed, and collection of the levy on what is sold requires them to
deal with large numbers of traders rather than one or two.  What options, then, are open to
District Councils to raise sufficient funds to carry out key public sector activities? 41
Table 11. Number of Dunavant Farmers per District, District Council Levies, and
Potential Revenue to District Councils
Province District




Eastern Chadiza 2,724 40 30,645
Chama 724 10 2,036
Chipata 6,166 10 17,342
Katete 9,305 100 261,712
Lundazi 4,000 10 11,250
Mambwe 2,860 10 8,044
Nyimba 1,175 10 3,305
Petauke 3,802 10 10,693
Central Chibombo 9,223 10 17,293
Kabwe Urban 959 10 1,798
Kapiri Mposhi 2,441 7 3,067
Mkushi 2,219 10 4,161
Mumbwa 17,279 10 32,398
Southern Choma 3,534 10 6,626
Gwembe 2,198 10 4,121
Itezhi-tezhi 996 10 1,868
Kalomo 2,015 10 3,778
Kazungula 872 10 1,635
Mazabuka 4,103 10 7,693
Monze 2,860 10 5,363
Namwala 1,897 10 3,557
Siavonga 260 10 488
Sinazongwe 1,758 10 3,296
Other Mpongwe 93 10 174
Chongwe 2,034 10 3,814
Kafue 476 10 893
Total 85,973 447,050
Note: Number of farmers from Dunavant records.  Levy from interviews with MLGH and Dunavant field
agents.  Potential revenue assumes 1.5 ha cotton per farmer, yields of 900 kg/ha in Eastern province, 600 kg/ha
elsewhere
This paper will not answer that question; simply raising it should make the point that it is
probably in the interests of these agro-industrial companies to work with local governments
on this issue, demonstrate their appreciation for the Councils’ quandary, and agree to pay
reasonable levies.  At least some players indicate that they are doing this.  At the same time,
District councils need to understand the longer term consequences of their taxing policies. 
Almost all governments in the rest of the world avoid taxing exports and often subsidize
them. Their objective is to be more competitive in world markets and promote economic
activity.  Since the price of cotton in world markets is not influenced by the small quantities
marketed by Zambia, the ginners cannot pass the tax on to buyers in the world market.  Most42
of the tax will fall on the growers.  At some level of taxation growers will reduce the
production of cotton. Migration of cotton production from districts with high taxes to those
with low taxes is likely.  It is also likely that this migration will be out of districts with
comparative advantage in cotton production and into those with less comparative advantage.
The result will be some economic loss to the economy.  The worst case would be that ginners
find it unprofitable to remain in Zambia
The use of the taxes will also influence the outcome.  If tax funds are used to reduce costs of
delivering cotton, the negative effect of the tax will be mitigated. Examples include improved
roads, greater security, or improvement in the enforcement of contracts.  If councils were to
market their levies in a way that the benefits of these levies were seen directly to impact on
reducing the cost of running the business of the taxed firms companies and individuals may
start viewing the tax as an opportunity. The point is that taxation policy is complex,
suggesting that government and donors should consider technical assistance to local councils
to grapple with this issue.43
6.  STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
6.1. Concentration at Ginning Level
In a review of cotton sector performance in six SSA countries, Poulton et al (echoed by
Boughton et al) suggest that, while liberalization has brought benefits to most countries, it
has worked best where the ginning sector is relatively concentrated.  As Poulton et al state,
“we find that the two ‘concentrated, market-based’ sectors in our review have been the most
successful in meeting the common coordination challenges facing the sectors and that they
have done this whilst still maintaining reasonable prices to producers.” After reviewing
performance in seven SSA countries, Tschirley and Zulu (2003) conclude that “Zambia’s
cotton sector emerges ... as a remarkable success. With no direct support from government or
donors, the sector has improved productivity and quality while paying farmers a higher
average price share than any other country in the analysis”. They suggest that one reason for
this success is that “Zambia appears to have found an effective balance between the often
conflicting needs for coordination and competition in the sector”.  
If these conclusions are correct, then one of the key challenges that Zambia’s cotton sector
faces is how to maintain this balance of workable competition in a dynamic market setting. 
The expansion of Dunavant in the country has to date had a positive influence on the sector. 
Competition between it and Clark in Eastern province is probably also positive – farmers in
the province enjoy the highest yields in the country and neither company complains of
serious problems of credit default (though they do indicate that some goes on).  The closure
of Amaka in 2002 is not in itself a problem unless it foreshadows the closure of other smaller
players; competition from players such as Continental and Mulungushi Textiles outside of
Eastern province is probably important as a discipline on Dunavant’s performance.
This line of argument suggests that the Cotton Outgrower Fund which was initiated in
2002/03, and which is slated to double in size for 2003/04, could be an important tool to
assist smaller firms to stay in the market while providing them with incentives to provide
better support to farmers and not promote strategic default.  Continental and CDT believe
that the program in 2002/03 helped it to nearly double its assistance to outgrowers.  The
challenge for managers of the fund will be to maintain the support of the largest players
(primarily Dunavant) while not having it be captured by them.
6.2. Productivity and Quality
As noted earlier in the paper, farm yields and ginning ratios in Zambia continue to lag well
behind those in Zimbabwe and West & Central Africa, and lint quality is substantially lower
than in Zimbabwe and Tanzania.  Varietal development can have major impacts on each of
these aspects.  Thus, the fact that no new varieties have been released and taken up since
liberalization does not bode well for the sector’s future performance.  Development,
dissemination, and maintenance of new varieties and consistent delivery of high quality
extension assistance require substantial resources over long periods of time, and this may be
difficult to ensure at needed levels through exclusive reliance on forced savings (e.g., levies)
within the sector.  Operating procedures within the sector to continuously improve seed
cotton and lint quality also require funds and effective collective action.  These areas thus24  See also Gibbon 1999, and Baffes 2002, for details and competing views  on Tanzania
25  Clark Cotton implies this when it suggests that it would not support the program "if it put everyone on the
same level" in terms of quality of assistance (personal communication).
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become an obvious candidate for funding by government and donors. The key to obtaining
and successfully deploying funding for this issue will be strong collaboration between
government, private companies, and farmers to ensure a clear vision and effective
management.  Ideally, a Cotton Board focused on long-term development issues as outlined
in section V.A.iii, rather than on policing of the sector as is currently contemplated in the
Cotton Act, would play a central role in this process.  A strengthened and perhaps
reorganized CDT would also need to make a major contribution.
In this context, and as part of a broader effort to improve productivity and quality through the
system, Zambia needs seriously to assess the potential contribution of Bt- and “Roundup
Ready” cotton on profitability for smallholders and cotton companies.  Work on Bt cotton in
1999 was abandoned due to the lack of a biosafety regulatory framework.  Currently, such a
framework is bogged down at the Ministerial level.  A key step forward would be to
recognize that biotechnology in a non-food cash crop like cotton raises fewer controversial
issues than it does in maize, and to move forward with a framework that would allow the
testing of Bt and perhaps Roundup Ready cotton.  
6.3. Loan Default
Loan default has receded since 2000 as a major issue in the sector.  Yet as long as the country
has serious competitors to the main players (and we argue that it is important that it does),
loan default will remain a potentially serious problem.  The government’s first foray into this
issue – the Cotton Outgrower Fund – is small in scope and needs clarification on a number of
issues (see Chapter 5 for more detail).  Yet the program is encouraging in the sense that it
works with and through private companies, focuses on reducing the cost to these companies
of providing input and extension services to farmers, and does not attempt to replace or
fundamentally alter the private systems already in place.  If the program is scaled-up in its
current form and managed properly, there is no reason to expect that it will discourage
continued innovation by private firms as they compete on the quality of their service, and
there is some basis to expect that it will help maintain a workable level of competition for the
main players.  
Assuming the program continues to expand, it must avoid errors seen in Uganda and
Tanzania, in which a governmental or quasi-governmental organization procured inputs and
distributed them to farmers.  An initial assessment of the system in Uganda (Goodland and
Gordon)
24 suggests that, while the approach substantially improved the very poor
performance of the country’s cotton sector, it suffers from rent seeking at all levels, lack of
timely delivery of inputs, and an “inherently paternalistic” approach in which farmers learn to
see the inputs as free (since the cost is “hidden” in the price paid to farmers) rather than a
loan which needs to be repaid.  In addition, the system as designed would seem to reduce
incentives for individual companies to innovate and improve the quality of their extension
and input services to farmers.
25  Given the well functioning outgrower schemes in Zambia,
there is no reason for the country to move in this direction.  45
6.4. Government Policy on Food Cropping and Fertilizer Use
As a land-locked and drought-prone developing country, the Zambian government’s
preoccupation with food crop production is both understandable and unlikely to change in the
near future.  At the same time, cotton companies and others are concerned that government
initiatives in this area are erratic, not sustainable, and potentially harmful to their own
activities, which also play an important, though perhaps under-appreciated, role in rural
livelihoods and food security.  Three recent decisions by the new government suggest that the
preoccupation with maize may be weakening. First, fertilizer distribution through FRA,
which focused almost entirely on maize and helped perpetuate a tendency among farmers to
view distributed inputs as grants rather than loans, was terminated, although there are some
indications that it might resume. The history and political sensitivity of this issue
unfortunately make it a very fluid area of policy, with frequent changes in direction.  Second,
government recently withdrew its proposal for a new Crop Marketing Authority, which many
feared would have repeated many of the mistakes of the FRA (Nijhoff et al. 2003).  Finally,
the new government launched a program of assistance to outgrower schemes for several cash
crops including cotton; while one can raise legitimate concerns about design of these
programs, the fact that the government is broadening its attention beyond maize to key cash
crops has to be taken as a positive development.46
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Appendix Table 1: Relationships for Vertical, Horizontal, and System-wide Coordination in Zambia’s Cotton Sector
Coordinating Bodies:
Zambia National Farmers’ Union was previously called the Commercial Farmers Bureau, when it represented only commercial farmers.  Has expanded its mandate in recent years to include
smallholders, but has to date not played an active coordination role on their behalf.
Cotton Ginners’ Association was formed in 1999 to represent interests of ginning companies.  Has been very active in presenting policy and program proposals to government and donors, and
in encouraging some level of broader, sector-wide coordination.
Cotton Development Trust is a private, non-profit organization formed primarily with ex-public sector personnel involved in technical cotton research.  Has focused on varietal development ...
Agricultural Consultative Forum was formed with explicit objective of promoting dialogue and conflict resolution across the agricultural sector.  Has helped facilitate at least two cotton
sector-wide meetings since 1999.
FSRP (Food Security Research Project involving Michigan State University, MAFF, and ACF) has co-sponsored sector-wide meetings in 1999 and 2001 with ACF.
Type of
Coordination
Objective Potential Coordination Mechanisms Observed Coordination Mechanisms
Market Non-Market
Horizontal Provision of public goods  NA Voluntary adoption of common grades /
grading procedures; 
Information sharing on defaulters (formal or
informal); 
Joint funding of research;
Varietal zoning agreements;
All companies seem to use common grades as developed by CDT.
Grading procedures at the gin level, however, can vary substantially.
Information sharing has been proposed to deal with credit recovery
problem, but has been very limited in practice.
Currently all cotton research carried-out by CDT with government
and donor funding.  Mechanisms for private sector funding in process
of being implemented.  





NA Voluntary adoption of a common
contractual form;
Information sharing on defaulters (formal or
informal); 
Area of operation agreements (formal or
informal);
No formal adoption of common contractual forms, though several
companies moved in similar directions starting in 1999 regarding
organization of outgrower scheme.  Best known of these is the
Dunavant Distributor System
Little or none (see above).  Some information is shared, but not acted
upon. 
No formal agreements.  Evidence of attempts at informal agreements,
but little success in maintaining.Type of
Coordination
Objective Potential Coordination Mechanisms Observed Coordination Mechanisms
Market Non-Market
49
Setting prices  Price leadership Price fixing (typically informal);
Price negotiation with producer
organizations;
Price negotiation with government;








- Meetings / activities of ginners’ association;
Collaboration between CDT and private
sector.  
Sponsoring of open public/private fora;
“Closed-door” lobbying (typically
informal?)
Ginners’ Association, with leadership from Dunavant, has regularly
lobbied government on policy issues, focusing primarily on credit
recovery issue.  Currently (July 02) has proposal for “Food Security
through Cotton” before government.
CDT worked very closely with ginners and other stakeholders
developing a) proposal for sector-wide credit fund, b) new Cotton Act
to form Cotton Board.
ACF and FSRP in collaboration with Ginners’ Association and ZNFU
have sponsored two such forums, with broad policy focus.
Not clear, but likely that this has increased with new administration
coming to power in late 2001, which is more focused on agriculture.






Contracting with farmers (contracts can
have multiple objectives);
Contracting with input firms;
Promoting farmer organizations;
Mulungushi Textiles integrated backwards to ginning in 1999. 
Mukuba Textiles also owns a small gin but buys most of its lint.
Predominant mode currently is contracting with distributors/contact
farmers/agents, who then contract with farmers.  Contracts with
farmers appear to be primarily informal.
None  
Some collaboration of NGOs with Dunavant and other ginners;
SHEMP project and “Food Security through Cotton” project.
Increasing productivity -- Contracting with farmers (contracts can
have multiple objectives);
Contracting with input firms;
Promoting farmer organizations;










-- Annual cotton stakeholders’ forum; 
Crisis meetings when whole sector faces
trouble
No formalized annual forums, but at least two broad stakeholder
meetings since late 1999. 
Yes; see previous statement.  1999 meeting focused on credit recovery
problem and deficiencies in legal system.
Problem solving (private
collective action)
-- Annual cotton stakeholders’ forum; 
Crisis meetings when whole sector faces
trouble
See above